A pickpocket who can only steal a sticky note from your pocket, and only if they're already holding your phone
CVE-2025-58486 is an improper input validation flaw (CWE-20) in Samsung Account, the identity-management app pre-installed on every Samsung Galaxy device. Versions prior to 15.5.01.1 fail to sanitize certain inputs, allowing a local process — typically a malicious app already running on the device — to read a small amount of account-related data. The CVSS vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) confirms local access is required, no privileges are needed, and the impact ceiling is low confidentiality with zero integrity or availability effect.
Samsung tagged this MEDIUM at 4.0, which is fair by pure CVSS math. In practice, for an enterprise fleet the rating is generous. The attack surface is a single consumer-oriented mobile app, requires on-device code execution as a prerequisite (meaning the device is already partially compromised), and leaks only low-sensitivity account metadata — not credentials, tokens, or device-management keys. There is no public proof-of-concept, no in-the-wild exploitation, and an EPSS of 0.16% places it well below the noise floor. For a 10,000-host enterprise, this is backlog work.
3 steps from start to impact.
Attain local code execution on Galaxy device
- Malicious app installed on target Samsung Galaxy device
- Device runs Samsung Account < 15.5.01.1
- Google Play Protect blocks most known malware at install time
- Enterprise MDM policies typically restrict sideloading and enforce app allow-lists
- Samsung Knox provides additional runtime sandboxing on managed devices
Send crafted input to Samsung Account
- Samsung Account exposes a reachable IPC surface to local apps
- Input validation bypass works on the installed version
- Android's intent-filter and permission model may restrict which components are reachable
- Samsung's December 2025 update auto-delivers the fix via Galaxy Store
Exfiltrate low-sensitivity account metadata
- Successful bypass in step 2
- Leaked data is low-value metadata, not authentication material
- No pivot to device control, MDM bypass, or lateral movement
The supporting signals.
| In-the-Wild Exploitation | None observed. Not listed in CISA KEV. No campaign reporting from any vendor. |
|---|---|
| Proof-of-Concept | None public. No PoC on GitHub, Exploit-DB, or researcher blogs as of August 2026. |
| EPSS Score | 0.0016 (0.16%) — bottom decile, negligible predicted exploitation probability. |
| KEV Status | Not listed. No CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities entry. |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N — local vector, low confidentiality impact only. No integrity or availability effect. |
| Affected Versions | Samsung Account < 15.5.01.1 on all Samsung Galaxy devices shipping the app. |
| Fixed Version | Samsung Account 15.5.01.1, released via Galaxy Store and December 2025 Samsung Mobile Security update. Current version is 15.7.01.1. |
| Exposure Data | Samsung Account is pre-installed on all Galaxy devices but is not network-reachable — local attack vector only. No Shodan/Censys/GreyNoise footprint applies. |
| Disclosure Date | 2025-12-02, as part of Samsung's December 2025 security bulletin. |
| Researcher | Not publicly attributed. Reported through Samsung's internal or coordinated disclosure process. |
noisgate verdict.
The single most decisive factor is the local-only attack vector combined with low-confidentiality-only impact on a consumer mobile app that occupies no high-value enterprise role. Samsung Account is not infrastructure software — it manages consumer identity on handsets and has zero blast radius beyond the individual device's account metadata.
Why this verdict
- Local prerequisite implies prior compromise. AV:L means the attacker already has code running on the device. In an MDM-managed enterprise fleet with sideloading disabled and Play Protect active, achieving this prerequisite is itself a significant barrier.
- Impact ceiling is C:L with no I or A. Even successful exploitation yields only low-sensitivity account metadata (display name, email). No tokens, no credentials, no device-management keys, no pivot capability.
- Role multiplier: not applicable. Samsung Account is a consumer identity app on mobile handsets. It is not a domain controller, hypervisor, CI/CD system, backup server, PKI, PAM, or network edge appliance. The blast radius is confined to one user's Samsung account metadata on one device — no fleet, domain, or supply-chain impact. Fewer than 0% of installs occupy any high-value infrastructure role. The floor check does not trigger.
- No exploitation pressure. Zero PoC, zero KEV, EPSS at 0.16%. The patch has been available for 8+ months via Galaxy Store auto-update, meaning the vulnerable population is rapidly shrinking.
Why not higher?
Upgrading to MEDIUM or above would require either a broader impact (credential theft, device takeover, MDM bypass), a network-reachable attack surface, evidence of exploitation, or a high-value infrastructure role. None of these conditions are present. The local-only vector on a consumer mobile app with low-confidentiality-only impact does not warrant MEDIUM in an enterprise context.
Why not lower?
IGNORE would be appropriate only if the vulnerability were entirely theoretical or affected zero enterprise devices. Samsung Galaxy devices are common in BYOD and corporate-owned fleets, so some exposure exists. The flaw is real and confirmed by Samsung, just low-impact. LOW captures the residual risk accurately.
What to do — in priority order.
- Verify Samsung Account version via MDM inventory — Query your UEM/MDM (Intune, Workspace ONE, Knox Manage) for devices running Samsung Account < 15.5.01.1 and flag them for app update. No mitigation SLA applies for LOW — treat as backlog hygiene.
- Enforce Galaxy Store auto-update policy — Ensure managed Samsung devices have Galaxy Store auto-updates enabled so Samsung Account patches deploy without user action. Most devices will already have received 15.5.01.1+ over the past 8 months.
- Block sideloading on managed devices — Disable installation from unknown sources via MDM policy. This eliminates the primary vector for getting a malicious local app onto the device in the first place.
- Network-level controls (WAF, NGFW, IDS) — the vulnerability is local-only on the handset; no network traffic is involved in exploitation.
- Samsung Knox container isolation alone — the Samsung Account app runs outside the Knox container in the personal profile, so Knox work-profile isolation does not directly protect it.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run this on a macOS or Linux workstation that has adb connected to the target Samsung device via USB or Wi-Fi debugging. Requires ADB access (developer mode enabled on device). Example: bash check_samsung_account.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CVE-2025-58486 checker — Samsung Account version via ADB
# Run from workstation with adb connected to target device.
# Output: VULNERABLE / PATCHED / UNKNOWN
set -euo pipefail
PKG="com.osp.app.signin"
FIXED="15.5.01.1"
if ! command -v adb &>/dev/null; then
echo "UNKNOWN: adb not found in PATH"
exit 2
fi
VERSION=$(adb shell dumpsys package "$PKG" 2>/dev/null | grep -i versionName | head -1 | sed 's/.*versionName=//' | tr -d '[:space:]')
if [ -z "$VERSION" ]; then
echo "UNKNOWN: Could not determine Samsung Account version. Is the device connected?"
exit 2
fi
echo "Detected Samsung Account version: $VERSION"
# Compare versions using sort -V
MIN=$(printf '%s\n%s' "$VERSION" "$FIXED" | sort -V | head -1)
if [ "$MIN" = "$FIXED" ] && [ "$VERSION" != "$FIXED" ]; then
# VERSION is greater than FIXED
echo "PATCHED: Samsung Account $VERSION >= $FIXED"
exit 0
elif [ "$VERSION" = "$FIXED" ]; then
echo "PATCHED: Samsung Account $VERSION = $FIXED"
exit 0
else
echo "VULNERABLE: Samsung Account $VERSION < $FIXED"
exit 1
fiIf you remember one thing.
Sources
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.