This is a spare key hidden inside a room the intruder already had to break into first
As of 2026-06-06, I could not verify an official published record for CVE-2026-11064. The metadata you supplied lines up much more closely with CVE-2026-11123: an Android Chrome bug fixed before 149.0.7827.53, classified as CWE-457, where uninitialized use in ANGLE/GPU can leak sensitive process memory through crafted HTML. In plain English: after an attacker already gets code running in the browser renderer, this bug may let them read leftover data they should not see.
Google's MEDIUM label is defensible in generic browser-land, but for enterprise patch triage it is still too generous. The decisive friction is the prerequisite: the attacker must already have compromised the renderer process. That makes this a second-stage exploit-chain primitive with narrow real-world reach, Android-only scope, no KEV listing, and no reliable public weaponization I could verify.
4 steps from start to impact.
Land renderer code execution first
- Victim uses Chrome on Android
- Victim loads attacker-controlled content
- A separate renderer-compromise vulnerability is present and successfully exploited
- Requires chaining with another bug before this CVE becomes reachable
- Modern browser exploit mitigations raise cost for first-stage renderer compromise
- No verified public end-to-end exploit chain found in primary-source review
Trigger the ANGLE/GPU memory disclosure
- Renderer already compromised
- Vulnerable Chrome build prior to
149.0.7827.53 - Relevant GPU/ANGLE path reachable on the device
- Bug appears Android-specific, which narrows the affected population
- ANGLE/GPU behavior can vary by device, driver stack, and OS build
- Mobile browser exploit reliability is usually lower than lab conditions suggest
Harvest sensitive memory artifacts
- Useful secrets are resident in accessible process memory
- The leaked bytes are structured enough to be exploitable
- Leaked memory can be noisy and inconsistent
- Blast radius is usually limited to one browser session on one device
- Site/process isolation reduces what tends to coexist in a single renderer context
Exfiltrate what was recovered
- Recovered data is actionable
- Outbound network access from the browser remains available
- Many leaked fragments will be junk, stale, or low-value
- Enterprise value is highest only when the user is signed into sensitive SaaS in mobile Chrome
- Network controls may not stop exfil over ordinary HTTPS but can limit follow-on abuse
The supporting signals.
| Identity check | I could not verify an official CVE-2026-11064 record as of 2026-06-06. Your metadata matches CVE-2026-11123 most closely: same CWE-457, same fixed boundary 149.0.7827.53, and the same EPSS 0.00035. |
|---|---|
| Potentially confused sibling CVE | There is also CVE-2026-11119, an Android GPU issue in the same release batch, but that one is a potential sandbox escape with a much higher enriched CVSS; do not mix it with the likely intended info-leak record. |
| In-the-wild status | No evidence of active exploitation verified. I found no vendor statement of in-the-wild abuse for the likely intended record. |
| KEV status | Not KEV-listed in CISA's catalog at review time. |
| PoC availability | No reliable public PoC repository located in primary-source review. Expect private browser-exploit tradecraft if this gets used at all. |
| EPSS | 0.00035 (~0.035%, percentile ~10.8 for the likely intended CVE-2026-11123), which is consistent with a low-likelihood, chain-dependent browser issue. |
| CVSS interpretation | Your supplied vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N describes a user-assisted remote info leak with no direct integrity or availability hit. That is directionally aligned with the likely intended memory-disclosure flaw, but the official published CVE-2026-11123 record had no CNA CVSS yet when I checked. |
| Affected versions | Authoritative Chrome CNA data for the likely intended record says Chrome < 149.0.7827.53 is affected. |
| Fixed version | Fix boundary is 149.0.7827.53. Google publicly showed Android 149.0.7827.48 rolling out on 2026-05-28, so there may be short-lived Play rollout lag between public Android channel posts and the CVE fix boundary. |
| Exposure reality | This is Android-only and only exploitable after renderer compromise. In enterprise terms that means a post-initial-access browser chain component, not a mass remote compromise event. |
noisgate verdict.
The single most important factor is the prerequisite: the attacker must already have compromised the renderer process before this bug matters. That turns the issue from a broad remote browser risk into a narrow, second-stage Android-only information leak with no verified exploitation evidence.
Why this verdict
- Renderer compromise required: this is not initial access. Requiring a separate first-stage browser exploit is a major downward adjustment from the supplied 6.5 baseline.
- Android-only exposure: even if Chrome is common, this record is narrowed to Android builds below
149.0.7827.53, not your whole desktop browser estate. - Disclosure, not takeover: the likely intended bug leaks process memory; it does not hand the attacker direct persistence, remote code execution on the device, or enterprise-wide lateral movement by itself.
- No live-fire indicators: no KEV entry, no verified in-the-wild note, and no authoritative public PoC materially reduce urgency.
Why not higher?
If this were the sibling Android GPU bug that genuinely enabled a renderer-to-sandbox escape, or if Google/CISA had confirmed exploitation, the score would jump sharply. Likewise, an issue reachable without prior renderer compromise would deserve at least MEDIUM and likely higher.
Why not lower?
It still affects a massively deployed browser family and can expose sensitive browser-resident data on mobile devices. For high-risk users who do privileged SaaS administration from Android Chrome, even a chain-dependent info leak is not something to ignore outright.
What to do — in priority order.
- Force Chrome auto-update on managed Android — Use MDM/EMM controls and Play managed app policies to keep
com.android.chromecurrent. For a LOW noisgate verdict there is no mitigation SLA; treat this as backlog hygiene, but version drift on mobile browsers should still be cleaned up in your normal maintenance cycle. - Keep privileged workflows off mobile browsers — Restrict break-glass admin actions, cloud-console administration, and other high-value sessions from Android Chrome where feasible. This reduces the value of any browser-memory disclosure; for LOW, there is no formal mitigation deadline, so apply this as policy hardening rather than emergency response.
- Inventory sub-fixed Android Chrome versions — Query managed devices for Chrome versions below
149.0.7827.53and target stale cohorts first. This is mainly to reduce long-tail exposure and confirm whether you even have a meaningful affected population. - Enable additional site isolation for sensitive origins where supported — Chromium documents stronger isolation options on Android for organizations that need extra protection around high-value sites. This does not patch the bug, but it can reduce same-process data co-residency and lower leak usefulness.
- A perimeter WAF does not help; the bug is in local browser memory handling after the page is rendered.
- Patching desktop Chrome only misses the likely affected population because this issue is Android-specific.
- Generic network IDS signatures are weak here because the exploit path is custom HTML/JS inside an already compromised renderer, not a stable wire signature.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run this from an auditor workstation with ADB access to the target Android device, or adapt the same package query in your MDM shell. Invoke it as ./check_chrome_android.sh com.android.chrome 149.0.7827.53; no root is required, but the device must be reachable via adb shell and permit package metadata queries.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check_chrome_android.sh
# Purpose: Check whether Android Chrome is below a fixed version.
# Usage: ./check_chrome_android.sh [package_name] [fixed_version]
# Example: ./check_chrome_android.sh com.android.chrome 149.0.7827.53
# Exit codes: 0=PATCHED, 1=VULNERABLE, 2=UNKNOWN
set -u
PKG="${1:-com.android.chrome}"
FIXED="${2:-149.0.7827.53}"
command -v adb >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "UNKNOWN: adb not found in PATH"
exit 2
}
adb get-state >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
echo "UNKNOWN: no adb device available"
exit 2
}
raw="$(adb shell dumpsys package "$PKG" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' | grep -m1 'versionName=')"
if [ -z "$raw" ]; then
echo "UNKNOWN: package '$PKG' not found or versionName unavailable"
exit 2
fi
INSTALLED="${raw#*=}"
INSTALLED="$(echo "$INSTALLED" | xargs)"
norm_ver() {
local v="$1"
local IFS='.'
local parts
read -r -a parts <<< "$v"
printf '%d %d %d %d\n' "${parts[0]:-0}" "${parts[1]:-0}" "${parts[2]:-0}" "${parts[3]:-0}"
}
ver_lt() {
local a b
a=( $(norm_ver "$1") )
b=( $(norm_ver "$2") )
for i in 0 1 2 3; do
if [ "${a[$i]}" -lt "${b[$i]}" ]; then
return 0
elif [ "${a[$i]}" -gt "${b[$i]}" ]; then
return 1
fi
done
return 1
}
if ver_lt "$INSTALLED" "$FIXED"; then
echo "VULNERABLE: $PKG installed version $INSTALLED is below fixed version $FIXED"
exit 1
else
echo "PATCHED: $PKG installed version $INSTALLED is at or above fixed version $FIXED"
exit 0
fi
If you remember one thing.
CVE-2026-11064 does not currently verify, and the technical details map best to CVE-2026-11123. Then pull an inventory of managed Android devices running Chrome below 149.0.7827.53, clean up stragglers in your normal mobile browser patch cycle, and keep privileged admin workflows off Android Chrome where possible. Because this lands in LOW, there is no noisgate mitigation SLA and no noisgate remediation SLA; treat it as backlog hygiene, document the renderer-compromise prerequisite, and patch through standard maintenance rather than emergency change.Sources
- Vulnerability-Lookup record for CVE-2026-11123
- Vulnerability-Lookup record for CVE-2026-11119
- Chrome Releases: Early Stable Update for Desktop 149.0.7827.53/.54
- Chrome Releases homepage showing Android 149.0.7827.48 rollout
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
- FIRST EPSS data and daily reports
- Chromium Site Isolation overview
- Chromium GPU process design document
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.