This is the second lock on the door, not the burglar getting through the front gate
CVE-2026-11167 is an Android-specific Chrome/WebView sandbox-escape condition: on versions prior to 149.0.7827.53, an attacker who has already compromised the renderer process can use a crafted HTML page to try to break into a more privileged browser context. That prerequisite matters more than the scary CVSS label. Affected population is Chrome on Android / Android WebView code before the fix train that landed in the 149.0.7827.x family; Android stable later shipped as 149.0.7827.59 with the same security fixes.
The vendor-side 9.6 CRITICAL score is mathematically correct for a hypothetical remote chain, but operationally inflated for enterprise patch triage because this bug is not initial access. Chrome itself tags it as *Chromium security severity: Medium*, and that lines up better with reality: no KEV entry, no public exploitation evidence, no public PoC, tiny EPSS, and the attacker must first land a separate renderer bug before this CVE even comes into play.
4 steps from start to impact.
Land a renderer foothold with a separate bug
CVE-2026-11167 is a stage-two primitive, not the opener.- Target is using vulnerable Chrome/WebView on Android
- Attacker has a separate renderer-compromise primitive
- User reaches attacker-controlled content
- Requires a second vulnerability or prior browser compromise
- Modern Safe Browsing, site isolation, and renderer hardening shrink usable chains
- No public exploit chain is available for this CVE
Trigger the WebView implementation flaw
- Renderer already compromised
- Attacker can steer page content or navigation
- Affected version is below
149.0.7827.53
- Issue details are not public from Chromium bug tracker
- No weaponized tooling is publicly posted
- Android/browser state may need to line up precisely
Attempt sandbox escape
- Successful trigger of the vulnerable code path
- Android device protections do not block the transition
- Exploit is reliable on the target build/device mix
- Sandbox escapes are materially harder than renderer compromise alone
- Exploit reliability varies across Android builds and OEM variants
- Mobile exploit development cost is high without published internals
Use post-sandbox privileges for follow-on actions
- Sandbox escape succeeded
- Attacker has follow-on payloads or objectives
- Device management controls do not contain the session
- No evidence of in-the-wild campaigns using this CVE
- Further privilege gains may need yet another step
- Enterprise Android fleets often have MDM compliance controls and app update enforcement
The supporting signals.
| In-the-wild status | No confirmed exploitation found. I found no KEV listing and no public reporting of active campaigns using this CVE. |
|---|---|
| KEV status | Not listed in CISA KEV as of 2026-06-05; no due date pressure from KEV. |
| Proof-of-concept availability | No public PoC located. Chromium issue 502228856 is referenced, but public details are not exposed. |
| EPSS | Very low. Your supplied value is 0.00062; third-party mirrors I checked show roughly 0.0003 class values, which all point the same way: low near-term exploitation probability. |
| CVSS and what it misses | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H yields 9.6, but CVSS does not model the real prerequisite that the attacker must already own the renderer. |
| Vendor vs Chromium severity | CISA-ADP / vendor-facing score is CRITICAL 9.6, while the Chrome release notes describe it as Chromium security severity: Medium. For patch operations, Chromium's internal severity tracks reality better here. |
| Affected versions | Google Chrome on Android / WebView code before 149.0.7827.53. |
| Fixed versions | Code fix threshold is 149.0.7827.53; Android stable later shipped as Chrome for Android 149.0.7827.59, which the release notes say carries the desktop security fixes unless otherwise noted. |
| Exposure and scanning reality | Not internet-fingerprintable in the usual sense. Shodan/Censys/FOFA-style exposure counts are the wrong model because this is a client-side Android browser/WebView issue, so population sizing comes from your MDM inventory, not external scanning. |
| Disclosure and reporter | Published by Chrome on 2026-06-04; Chrome release notes say it was reported by Google on 2026-04-13. |
noisgate verdict.
The decisive factor is the prerequisite: exploitation requires the attacker to have already compromised Chrome's renderer process, which makes this a stage-two browser-chain bug rather than an initial-entry bug. That sharply narrows both the reachable population and the number of real adversaries who can use it, despite the high theoretical impact after a successful chain.
Why this verdict
- Major downgrade for attacker position: exploitation requires a compromised renderer process first. That implies the attacker already burned another browser bug or equivalent compromise step before this CVE matters.
- Population is narrower than desktop Chrome CVEs: this is Android Chrome/WebView, not a generic externally reachable enterprise service. Real exposure depends on your mobile fleet size and update drift, not on internet-facing attack surface.
- Modern controls add friction: Safe Browsing, Chrome hardening, Android sandboxing, SELinux/seccomp, OEM mitigations, and MDM-driven auto-updates all reduce practical weaponization.
- No field evidence: no KEV listing, no public exploitation reporting, and no public PoC materially lower urgency.
- Tiny EPSS supports the downgrade: even if the exact mirrored value varies, the score is in the very low band.
Why not higher?
A higher rating would be justified if this were a one-click initial compromise or if there were active exploitation, KEV listing, or a public exploit chain. None of that is present here. The need for prior renderer compromise is a compounding friction point that CVSS fails to price in.
Why not lower?
This is still a sandbox-escape primitive in one of the most targeted software classes on the planet. If an attacker already has a renderer bug, this kind of CVE can be the difference between a crash and a full chain, so it is not backlog junk.
What to do — in priority order.
- Enforce browser auto-update — Use managed Google Play / MDM policy to require Chrome and Android System WebView auto-updates. For a MEDIUM verdict there is no mitigation SLA; treat this as standard hardening and complete the actual version uplift within the
365-dayremediation window. - Block stale Android browsers in compliance policy — Create an MDM compliance rule that flags or restricts devices running Chrome/WebView below the fixed train. This reduces long-tail exposure without needing emergency response; for MEDIUM, there is no mitigation SLA — go straight to remediation.
- Reduce risky browsing contexts — Where your MDM stack supports it, restrict unmanaged sideloaded browsers and keep users on the managed Chrome channel so fixes propagate predictably. This is a normal-risk control improvement to complete alongside remediation within
365 days. - Watch for chained-browser activity — Tune MTD/EDR alerts for repeated Chrome/WebView crashes, exploit-style browser instability, and high-risk navigation patterns on corporate Android devices. This does not replace patching, but it gives you a chance to catch the separate renderer-stage bug this CVE depends on.
- A WAF does not meaningfully help; the vulnerable component is the client browser/WebView on Android, not your web app edge.
- Perimeter network scanning does not help you find vulnerable assets; this is not an internet-facing daemon and won't show up as a neat external exposure count.
- Desktop browser patch status is irrelevant; this CVE is specifically about Chrome/WebView on Android.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run this from an auditor workstation that has adb installed and an authorized Android device connected. Invoke it as ./check_cve_2026_11167.sh SERIAL or ./check_cve_2026_11167.sh for the only attached device; it needs no root, but it does require USB debugging (or equivalent adb) access.
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# check_cve_2026_11167.sh
# Verifies whether connected Android device has Chrome / Android System WebView
# versions affected by CVE-2026-11167.
#
# Logic:
# - Vulnerable if installed version is < 149.0.7827.53
# - Patched if installed version is >= 149.0.7827.53
# - Checks both Chrome and Android System WebView if present
#
# Exit codes:
# 0 = PATCHED
# 1 = VULNERABLE
# 2 = UNKNOWN / unable to determine
set -u
THRESHOLD="149.0.7827.53"
SERIAL_ARG="${1:-}"
ADB=(adb)
if [[ -n "$SERIAL_ARG" ]]; then
ADB+=( -s "$SERIAL_ARG" )
fi
packages=("com.android.chrome" "com.google.android.webview")
found_any=0
vulnerable_any=0
unknown_any=0
version_ge() {
# returns 0 if $1 >= $2
local a b IFS=.
read -r -a a <<< "$1"
read -r -a b <<< "$2"
local len=${#a[@]}
if (( ${#b[@]} > len )); then len=${#b[@]}; fi
for ((i=0; i<len; i++)); do
local ai=${a[i]:-0}
local bi=${b[i]:-0}
if ((10#$ai > 10#$bi)); then return 0; fi
if ((10#$ai < 10#$bi)); then return 1; fi
done
return 0
}
get_version() {
local pkg="$1"
"${ADB[@]}" shell dumpsys package "$pkg" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' | awk -F= '/versionName=/{print $2; exit}'
}
# Basic adb connectivity check
if ! "${ADB[@]}" get-state >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "UNKNOWN - adb device not available or unauthorized"
exit 2
fi
echo "Checking threshold: $THRESHOLD"
for pkg in "${packages[@]}"; do
ver="$(get_version "$pkg")"
if [[ -z "$ver" ]]; then
echo "$pkg: not installed or version unknown"
unknown_any=1
continue
fi
found_any=1
echo "$pkg: installed version $ver"
if version_ge "$ver" "$THRESHOLD"; then
echo "$pkg: PATCHED"
else
echo "$pkg: VULNERABLE"
vulnerable_any=1
fi
done
if (( found_any == 0 )); then
echo "UNKNOWN - neither Chrome nor Android System WebView version could be determined"
exit 2
fi
if (( vulnerable_any == 1 )); then
echo "VULNERABLE"
exit 1
fi
if (( unknown_any == 1 )); then
echo "UNKNOWN - at least one relevant package could not be evaluated"
exit 2
fi
echo "PATCHED"
exit 0
If you remember one thing.
365 days by getting affected devices to 149.0.7827.53+ code level, noting that Android stable shipped the fixes in 149.0.7827.59.Sources
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.