This is a fake security badge on the front door, not a broken lock
CVE-2026-11175 is a Chrome on Android UI spoofing flaw in the Messages component. A malicious site can trigger incorrect security UI on vulnerable Chrome for Android builds before 149.0.7827.53, letting an attacker make browser chrome or trust cues look more legitimate than they are via a crafted HTML page.
The vendor's HIGH 8.8 score overstates real enterprise risk. In practice this is not remote code execution, sandbox escape, or device takeover; it is a social-engineering assist that still requires the victim to open attacker-controlled content and then trust or act on a spoofed prompt or indicator. That makes it meaningful for phishing-resistant orgs, but not a drop-everything emergency.
4 steps from start to impact.
Deliver a lure to mobile Chrome
- Victim uses Chrome on Android
- Chrome version is older than 149.0.7827.53
- Attacker can get the user to open a malicious link
- Requires user interaction
- Android-only scope cuts out desktop Chrome and iOS fleets
- URL filtering, Safe Browsing, mobile threat defense, and mail filtering can stop the lure before the browser is involved
Trigger the vulnerable Messages UI state
Messages UI path and causes incorrect security UI rendering. The effective tool is simply custom HTML/JavaScript shaped to reach the vulnerable state; I found no public PoC or turnkey exploit kit tied to this CVE during research.- The vulnerable UI path in
Messagesmust be reachable from web content - The page must render successfully in the victim's browser session
- This is a spoofing primitive, not memory corruption
- A lot of real users will bounce before the spoof is shown cleanly enough to matter
- Browser/UI changes, locale differences, and device form factors can make spoof pages brittle
Convert spoofed trust into user action
- Victim must believe the spoofed indicator
- Victim must take a follow-on action such as login, consent, or click-through
- Phishing-resistant MFA and conditional access sharply reduce payoff
- Password managers and federated login UX often expose mismatches that break the scam
- Security-aware users may notice URL, account context, or unusual flow timing
Abuse stolen trust outside the browser
- User credentials, session material, or approval must be captured
- Targeted accounts must have access worth abusing
- Blast radius is usually one user/account at a time
- Enterprise SSO, device posture checks, and anomalous login detections can still block or contain follow-on abuse
- No direct host compromise means EDR bypass value is limited
The supporting signals.
| In-the-wild status | No confirmed exploitation found during research. No CISA KEV listing as of 2026-06-06. |
|---|---|
| Public PoC availability | No public PoC located for this specific CVE. Attack construction appears to be custom crafted HTML/JS, which lowers commoditization. |
| EPSS | 0.0007 from the prompt; that is extremely low exploitation probability. Percentile was not available from the retrieved primary-source data. |
| KEV status | Not listed in the CISA KEV catalog as of 2026-06-06. |
| CVSS vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H from the prompt. The decisive field is UI:R: the attacker still needs the victim to engage with malicious content. |
| Affected versions | Google Chrome on Android prior to 149.0.7827.53. |
| Fixed version | 149.0.7827.53 or later. Chrome on Android is distributed through Google Play / managed Play. |
| Scanning / exposure reality | Internet exposure scanners are basically irrelevant here because this is a client-side mobile browser flaw, not a remotely discoverable service. Your real exposure metric is fleet app-version inventory from EMM/MDM. |
| Disclosure timeline | Prompt says disclosed 2026-06-04. Third-party aggregation showed public CVE visibility on 2026-06-05. |
| Researcher / reporting | Not determined from retrieved primary sources. Google often withholds bug details until uptake improves, and I did not locate a primary source naming the reporter for this CVE. |
noisgate verdict.
The single biggest downward pressure is that this bug requires user interaction and only produces a spoofing condition, not code execution or sandbox escape. It matters because Chrome on Android is broadly deployed and trust-UI bugs can improve phishing conversion, but the blast radius remains per-user and post-click.
Why this verdict
- UI:R is real friction — the attacker must get the user onto malicious content and then convince them to act on the spoof
- Android-only scope narrows population compared with a cross-platform Chrome issue, which materially reduces reachable enterprise exposure
- This is a spoofing primitive, not host compromise — no direct RCE, no sandbox breakout, and no automatic lateral movement from the bug itself
- Low threat intel heat — no KEV entry, no confirmed in-the-wild activity, and an EPSS of 0.0007 all argue against emergency-tier handling
- Widespread deployment keeps it above LOW — Chrome on Android is common in managed mobile fleets, so even a phishing helper can affect a lot of users if left stale
Why not higher?
A higher rating would need either active exploitation, a publicly weaponized PoC, or a path to direct device/browser compromise. None of those signals are present here. The chain also compounds friction: remote lure plus user click plus successful deception plus reusable business impact.
Why not lower?
It is not LOW because security UI is part of the trust boundary in a browser, especially on mobile where screen real estate hides context and users move quickly through auth flows. In enterprises that rely on mobile SSO, phishing-resistant design failures can still translate into credential theft or fraudulent approvals.
What to do — in priority order.
- Force Chrome auto-update through EMM — Use Managed Google Play / Android Enterprise policy to keep
com.android.chromecurrent and block long-lived stale versions. For a MEDIUM noisgate verdict there is no mitigation SLA — go straight to the 365-day remediation window, but this is cheap hygiene and should be turned on now if it is not already. - Constrain unmanaged mobile browsing — Where business apps depend on mobile web auth, require managed devices and managed browsers for sensitive workflows. There is no mitigation SLA for MEDIUM, so treat this as control hardening while completing remediation within 365 days.
- Lean on phishing-resistant auth — FIDO2/passkeys, number matching, and tight conditional access reduce the value of spoofed trust indicators because a fake page cannot easily replay possession-bound authentication. There is no mitigation SLA for MEDIUM, but this materially cuts consequence while the fleet ages out stale versions.
- Raise detections on mobile-origin phishing — Correlate mobile click telemetry, Safe Browsing blocks, IdP sign-in anomalies, and impossible-travel detections to catch the *follow-on abuse* this CVE is most likely to enable. Again, no mitigation SLA here; use the normal security engineering cycle while remediating the vulnerable app version inside 365 days.
- A network vuln scanner will not meaningfully surface this, because the exposed thing is a mobile client app version, not a listening service.
- EDR exploit prevention tuned for memory corruption is the wrong control family; this bug is about deception/UI trust, not shellcode execution.
- A WAF does not solve a client-side phishing/spoofing issue in users' browsers unless your entire threat model is only your own web apps.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run this from an auditor workstation with adb installed against a USB-connected or network-connected Android device that has developer access authorized. Example: python check_chrome_android_cve_2026_11175.py --serial R58N1234567. It needs permission to run adb shell dumpsys package com.android.chrome; no root is required.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# Check Google Chrome on Android for CVE-2026-11175
# Outputs: VULNERABLE / PATCHED / UNKNOWN
# Exit codes: 0=PATCHED, 1=VULNERABLE, 2=UNKNOWN, 3=usage/dependency error
import argparse
import re
import shutil
import subprocess
import sys
FIXED = (149, 0, 7827, 53)
PKG = "com.android.chrome"
def parse_version(v):
m = re.findall(r"\d+", v or "")
if len(m) < 4:
return None
return tuple(int(x) for x in m[:4])
def cmp_ver(a, b):
return (a > b) - (a < b)
def run(cmd):
try:
p = subprocess.run(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False)
return p.returncode, p.stdout, p.stderr
except Exception as e:
return 99, "", str(e)
def get_version(serial=None):
adb = shutil.which("adb")
if not adb:
print("UNKNOWN - adb not found in PATH")
sys.exit(3)
base = [adb]
if serial:
base += ["-s", serial]
rc, out, err = run(base + ["shell", "dumpsys", "package", PKG])
if rc != 0:
print(f"UNKNOWN - failed to query package via adb: {err.strip() or out.strip()}")
sys.exit(2)
# Try common fields first
for line in out.splitlines():
line = line.strip()
m = re.search(r"versionName=([^\s]+)", line)
if m:
return m.group(1)
# Fallback: parse package dump more loosely
m = re.search(r"versionName=([^\s]+)", out)
if m:
return m.group(1)
return None
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Check Chrome on Android for CVE-2026-11175")
ap.add_argument("--serial", help="adb device serial", default=None)
args = ap.parse_args()
version = get_version(args.serial)
if not version:
print("UNKNOWN - could not determine Chrome version")
sys.exit(2)
parsed = parse_version(version)
if not parsed:
print(f"UNKNOWN - unrecognized version format: {version}")
sys.exit(2)
if cmp_ver(parsed, FIXED) < 0:
print(f"VULNERABLE - {PKG} version {version} is older than 149.0.7827.53")
sys.exit(1)
else:
print(f"PATCHED - {PKG} version {version} is 149.0.7827.53 or newer")
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
If you remember one thing.
com.android.chrome on Android, identify devices below 149.0.7827.53, and confirm Managed Play auto-update is actually working. For a MEDIUM verdict there is no noisgate mitigation SLA — go straight to the 365-day remediation window; that means no emergency block is required unless you have separate phishing activity hitting mobile users, but you should still clear stale versions through normal mobile patch operations and complete the browser upgrade within the noisgate remediation SLA of 365 days.Sources
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.