A CFM directory that reads any file the JVM can touch — and executes what it finds
CVE-2026-48282 is a path traversal (CWE-22) in Adobe ColdFusion that lets an unauthenticated remote attacker escape the intended web root and reach arbitrary paths on the host. Adobe's own advisory (APSB26-68) chains the traversal into arbitrary code execution in the security context of the ColdFusion service account. Affected versions are ColdFusion 2025 Update 9 and earlier and ColdFusion 2023 Update 20 and earlier, on every supported OS. Fixed builds are ColdFusion 2025 Update 10 and ColdFusion 2023 Update 21, both shipped 2026-06-30.
Vendor severity is CRITICAL / 10.0 with vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. That matches reality. ColdFusion is a canonical *high-value-role* application server — it typically fronts the public internet, runs as a privileged service, and holds datasource credentials to production databases. Historical ColdFusion path-traversal / file-upload bugs (CVE-2023-26360, CVE-2023-29298/29300, CVE-2024-20767) all went from advisory to mass exploitation and KEV listing inside weeks. There is no meaningful friction that pulls this below CRITICAL.
5 steps from start to impact.
Discover an exposed ColdFusion instance
nuclei templates that fingerprint the Server: header, /CFIDE/administrator/, and .cfm handlers. ColdFusion is easy to fingerprint even when the admin console is firewalled.- Target has ColdFusion 2025 ≤ Update 9 or 2023 ≤ Update 20
- HTTP(S) reachable from attacker network
- Some organizations front CF with a WAF that blocks
../sequences - Admin panel often restricted to internal networks
Server: JRun and /CFIDE/ favicon hash; nuclei has adobe-coldfusion-detect.yaml.Send crafted path-traversal request
..%2f, ..%5c, double-encoded, or UTF-8 overlong forms) that bypass the sanitizer and resolve to a path outside the intended directory. Weaponization will likely surface in a public PoC repo within days — prior ColdFusion traversals (CVE-2023-26360) had Metasploit modules within a week.- Unauthenticated HTTP access to the vulnerable endpoint
- No inline WAF normalization
- Modern WAFs (Cloudflare, Akamai, F5 ASM) default rulesets catch naive
../ - Reverse proxies sometimes canonicalize the URL before CF sees it
Read sensitive files or stage a payload
neo-security.xml, password.properties, seed.properties, datasource configs, and web.xml to harvest CF admin hashes, RDS credentials, and DB connection strings. Attacker uses curl/httpx to script mass extraction.- Traversal reaches ColdFusion install directory
- Service account has read on
lib/andcfusion/
- Filesystem ACL hardening (rare in default installs)
- Datasource passwords are encrypted but the seed is on-box
neo-security.xml by the CF process serving an HTTP request; most orgs are not tuned for this.Chain to arbitrary code execution
.cfm webshell into a served directory via a companion upload primitive, or abuses CF's scheduled task / component loader to have the traversed file evaluated as CFML. Result: RCE as the ColdFusion service user — typically SYSTEM on Windows or the cfusion user on Linux. Expect Metasploit module exploit/multi/http/adobe_coldfusion_cve_2026_48282 within the quarter.- Write primitive OR a location where CF will interpret the file as CFML
- Service account can write to web-served path
- Hardened installs run CF as an unprivileged user with a read-only webroot
- AppArmor/SELinux profiles (extremely rare on CF hosts)
coldfusion.exe/java spawning cmd.exe, powershell, /bin/sh; this is a strong high-fidelity signal.Pivot into datastore and internal network
- Datasource creds recoverable
- Internal reachability to DB tier / DC
- Network segmentation between DMZ CF and internal DBs
- LAPS + tiered admin model
The supporting signals.
| In-the-wild status | Adobe reports no known exploitation at disclosure. History says otherwise: CVE-2023-26360, CVE-2024-20767 both hit CISA KEV within weeks of patch. |
|---|---|
| Public PoC | None public as of 2026-07-03. Watch @Onapsis, @ProjectDiscovery, watchTowr, and Rapid7 Metasploit repos; historically first PoCs land within 7-14 days for CF traversals. |
| EPSS | 0.01021 (~1.0%). Low because the CVE is 3 days old; expect this to climb into the 90th+ percentile within a month as PoCs surface. |
| KEV status | Not listed as of 2026-07-03. Given the 3-of-last-3 track record for ColdFusion criticals, expect KEV listing on first observed exploitation. |
| CVSS vector | AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — network, no auth, no UI, scope change. Genuinely maximum risk envelope. |
| Affected versions | ColdFusion 2025 ≤ Update 9, ColdFusion 2023 ≤ Update 20, all OSes. ColdFusion 2021 is out of core support — treat as vulnerable and unfixable. |
| Fixed versions | ColdFusion 2025 Update 10, ColdFusion 2023 Update 21, released 2026-06-30 in APSB26-68. |
| Exposure data | Shodan typically shows ~11-14k internet-exposed ColdFusion instances globally; Censys ~9k. Concentrated in US gov/edu and Japanese hosting. |
| Disclosure | 2026-06-30 via Adobe Priority Rating 1 bulletin APSB26-68 (11 CVEs, 6 at CVSS 10.0). |
| Reporter | Adobe credited external researchers via its PSIRT program; specific attribution not published in APSB26-68 at time of writing. |
noisgate verdict.
Unauthenticated remote path-traversal-to-RCE on an application server that is canonically internet-exposed and runs as a privileged service — the single decisive factor is the role of the affected component: ColdFusion hosts sit in the DMZ, hold DB credentials, and have a documented track record of mass exploitation post-disclosure. There is no auth barrier, no user interaction, and no plausible deployment role where a successful chain doesn't end in host-level RCE.
Why this verdict
- Unauthenticated + network-reachable + no UI: the entire preconditions list is 'send an HTTP request'. Every friction audit step evaluates to 'attacker already qualifies'.
- Role multiplier — DMZ web/app server: ColdFusion's canonical deployment is internet-facing; a successful chain yields RCE as the service account, which is
SYSTEMon most Windows installs. Blast radius is host → datasource → domain within one attack window. - Role multiplier — high-value-role floor: ColdFusion is not a workstation or lab component; ≥50% of installs occupy the high-value 'public app server' role. Floor is CRITICAL per the deployment-role hard rule.
- Track record: CVE-2023-26360, CVE-2023-29300, CVE-2024-20767 — three consecutive ColdFusion CVEs of this class hit KEV within weeks. Base rate of exploitation is ~100%.
- Adobe Priority 1: Adobe reserves Priority 1 for 'higher risk of being targeted, exploit imminent'. Trust the vendor when they escalate their own scoring.
Why not higher?
Already at CRITICAL / 9.6. Reserving the last 0.4 points because no public PoC or in-the-wild exploitation is confirmed at 2026-07-03 — if either lands, this becomes a hard 10.0 with 'patch within hours' guidance.
Why not lower?
There is no friction to justify a downgrade. Every attempted narrowing (WAF, segmentation, hardened service account) is optional and demonstrably fails in the majority of ColdFusion installs history has shown compromised. EPSS is low only because the CVE is 3 days old; forward-looking exploitation probability is near-certain.
What to do — in priority order.
- Take internet-facing ColdFusion offline or WAF-gate immediately — Until you've applied Update 10 / 21, block all inbound HTTP(S) to ColdFusion from the internet, or enforce a WAF rule that rejects requests containing
..,%2e%2e,%252e,..%2f,..%5c, and requests to/CFIDE/administrator/*from non-admin source IPs. Per noisgate mitigation SLA for CRITICAL, deploy within 3 days — but given the exploitation track record of this product line, do it today. - Apply APSB26-68 patches: ColdFusion 2025 Update 10 or 2023 Update 21 — This is the only durable fix. Test in staging Monday, deploy production by end of week. noisgate remediation SLA for CRITICAL: within 90 days, but given the history of ColdFusion CVE weaponization inside 30 days, target production in 7-14 days.
- Rotate all ColdFusion datasource credentials, RDS passwords, and admin hashes — Assume
neo-security.xml,seed.properties, andpassword.propertiesmay already have been exfiltrated. Rotate DB creds referenced by CF datasources, CF admin password, RDS password, and any scheduled-task credentials. Complete within the 3-day mitigation window. - Enable enhanced Coldfusion admin lockdown per Adobe Lockdown Guide — Restrict the CFIDE administrator and RDS endpoints via web-server-level ACL, disable the RDS service on production, and enforce the sandboxing model. This won't stop the CVE alone but shrinks the useful post-exploit surface.
- Hunt retroactively for indicators of prior traversal exploitation — Even though Adobe reports no ITW at disclosure, search 90 days of web logs for requests containing traversal encodings against
.cfm/.cfcendpoints, and EDR-hunt forcoldfusion.exe/javaspawning shells or writing.cfm/.jspfiles under the webroot.
- Relying on the ColdFusion built-in sandbox: multiple prior traversal CVEs bypassed sandbox controls entirely; do not treat sandbox as a compensating control for this class.
- Blocking only
../literal in the WAF: PoCs will use%2e%2e, double URL encoding, and overlong UTF-8. Use a normalized-path WAF rule or an allowlist approach. - Restricting the admin UI to internal networks: this bug is not admin-panel-scoped; the vulnerable handler is reachable via the general web application surface.
- Running ColdFusion as a lower-privileged user: reduces blast radius but does not stop RCE or exfiltration of on-disk secrets and datasource strings.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run this on each Windows ColdFusion host as a local Administrator, e.g. powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File Check-CVE-2026-48282.ps1 -CFHome 'C:\ColdFusion2023'. It parses cfusion\lib\version.properties to determine installed version/update and compares to the fixed builds from APSB26-68. Output: VULNERABLE, PATCHED, or UNKNOWN.
#requires -Version 5.0
# Check-CVE-2026-48282.ps1
# Detects Adobe ColdFusion 2025 <= U9 or 2023 <= U20 (APSB26-68)
param(
[string]$CFHome = 'C:\ColdFusion2023'
)
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
function Exit-With($code, $msg) {
Write-Host $msg
exit $code
}
$versionFile = Join-Path $CFHome 'cfusion\lib\version.properties'
if (-not (Test-Path $versionFile)) {
# Try 2025 default path
$alt = 'C:\ColdFusion2025\cfusion\lib\version.properties'
if (Test-Path $alt) { $versionFile = $alt }
else { Exit-With 2 'UNKNOWN: version.properties not found; supply -CFHome' }
}
$props = @{}
Get-Content $versionFile | ForEach-Object {
if ($_ -match '^\s*([^#=]+)=(.*)$') { $props[$Matches[1].Trim()] = $Matches[2].Trim() }
}
$major = [int]($props['major'] | ForEach-Object { $_ })
$minor = [int]($props['minor'] | ForEach-Object { $_ })
$update = 0
if ($props.ContainsKey('update')) { $update = [int]$props['update'] }
elseif ($props.ContainsKey('hf_release')) { $update = [int]$props['hf_release'] }
$product = "ColdFusion $major.$minor Update $update"
Write-Host "Detected: $product"
# Fixed builds per APSB26-68
# CF 2025 -> Update 10; CF 2023 -> Update 21
if ($major -eq 2025) {
if ($update -ge 10) { Exit-With 0 "PATCHED: $product" }
else { Exit-With 1 "VULNERABLE: $product (need >= Update 10)" }
}
elseif ($major -eq 2023) {
if ($update -ge 21) { Exit-With 0 "PATCHED: $product" }
else { Exit-With 1 "VULNERABLE: $product (need >= Update 21)" }
}
elseif ($major -le 2021) {
Exit-With 1 "VULNERABLE: $product is end-of-core-support; no fix available"
}
else {
Exit-With 2 "UNKNOWN: unexpected ColdFusion major version $major"
}
If you remember one thing.
Sources
- Adobe Security Bulletin APSB26-68
- SecurityWeek — Adobe Patches Critical ColdFusion Vulnerabilities
- BleepingComputer — Adobe patches seven max severity ColdFusion, Campaign flaws
- The Hacker News — Adobe Patches 7 CVSS 10.0 Flaws in ColdFusion and Campaign Classic
- SOCRadar — Adobe ColdFusion and Campaign Classic Critical RCE
- SecurityAffairs — Adobe fixed multiple maximum-severity flaws
- CISA KEV Catalog (baseline reference)
- Adobe ColdFusion Lockdown Guide
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.