← Back to Feed CACHED · 2026-08-12 14:51:15 · CACHE_KEY CVE-2026-53413
CVE-2026-53413 · CWE-787 · Disclosed 2026-08-11

Missing bounds check in the annotator function of Zoom Clients

ASSESSED — NOISGATE V0.5
Vendor
Reassessed
Verdict:
Do you agree?
01 · The Real Story

Someone slipped a loaded gun into every whiteboard marker in every conference room on earth

CVE-2026-53413, dubbed Zoomsday by its discoverer, is a stack buffer overflow in CAnnoFormatBlock::Deserialize, the routine that parses text-annotation formatting data exchanged between Zoom meeting participants during screen sharing. The function uses four fixed-size 128-byte buffers but trusts a 32-bit character-count field supplied over the wire, allowing an attacker to write past the buffer boundary with controlled data. Exploitation requires only that the attacker participate in (or host) the same Zoom meeting as the victim — no click, no prompt, no visual indicator. All Zoom Workplace desktop and mobile clients before 7.1.5 / 7.0.6, VDI Client before 7.0.11 / 6.6.16, Rooms before 7.1.5, and Meeting SDK before 7.1.5 are affected across Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, and Android.

Zoom rated this HIGH at CVSS 3.1 / 8.3, setting AC:H and UI:R. Both modifiers are generous. The discoverer (Idan Levcovich, A Security) achieved a working RCE exploit within 24 hours of finding the bug, which argues against high attack complexity. The 'user interaction' amounts to the victim being in a meeting where screen sharing is active — which describes the majority of Zoom usage. The CVSS 4.0 score from the researcher is 9.0. Zoom's own label undersells the practical severity of a zero-click, cross-platform, remotely-triggerable RCE in a client installed on 300 million+ daily active endpoints spanning every tier of the enterprise.

"Zero-click RCE in Zoom annotation means every meeting is a potential kill chain entry point."
02 · The Attack Path

5 steps from start to impact.

STEP 01

Gain meeting presence

The attacker joins a target Zoom meeting. This can be achieved via a shared meeting link, calendar invitation, or by hosting a meeting and inviting targets. Public webinars, recurring all-hands, and cross-company meetings all qualify. No Zoom account is strictly required for many meeting configurations.
Conditions required:
  • Meeting link or invitation
  • Network connectivity to Zoom infrastructure
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Meetings with waiting rooms or passcodes add a gate
  • Host-managed admission (waiting room) can block unknown participants
STEP 02

Trigger screen-share annotation channel

Once in the meeting, the attacker initiates or waits for screen sharing. The annotation protocol opens a direct communication channel between the sharer and all viewers. The attacker can share their own screen to establish this channel with every participant simultaneously, or wait for another participant to share.
Conditions required:
  • At least one participant sharing screen, or attacker shares own screen
  • Annotation feature not disabled by admin
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Organizations that disable annotation via admin policy block this step entirely
  • Some managed deployments restrict screen sharing to hosts only
STEP 03

Send crafted annotation PDU

The attacker sends a specially crafted annotation Protocol Data Unit (opcode 0x10001) containing a text formatting block with an oversized character count. The CAnnoFormatBlock::Deserialize routine copies the attacker-supplied data into fixed 128-byte stack buffers without bounds checking. This is zero-click — the victim's client parses the PDU automatically with no UI prompt or visual indicator.
Conditions required:
  • Knowledge of the annotation PDU format (documented in the Zoomsday writeup)
  • Ability to send annotation data (meeting participant role)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • No public PoC exists yet — attacker needs to reverse-engineer or replicate from the advisory
  • Stack canaries, ASLR, and DEP/NX on modern OSes complicate reliable exploitation
Detection/coverage: No signature-based detection currently available; network inspection of Zoom's encrypted protocol is not feasible for most enterprises
STEP 04

Achieve code execution on victim host

The buffer overflow overwrites adjacent stack memory. With ASLR bypass (platform-dependent), the attacker gains arbitrary code execution in the context of the Zoom process. On Windows this is the current user context; on macOS/Linux similarly user-level. No privilege escalation is inherent, but the attacker now has a foothold on the victim's workstation with access to files, credentials, and network position.
Conditions required:
  • Successful exploitation of the overflow
  • Platform-specific ASLR/canary bypass
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Modern exploit mitigations vary by platform — iOS is hardest, Windows/macOS are well-studied
  • EDR agents may detect post-exploitation activity (shellcode, process injection)
Detection/coverage: EDR behavioral detection of anomalous Zoom child processes or memory injection; CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, and Defender for Endpoint have generic memory corruption heuristics
STEP 05

Pivot from compromised endpoint

With code execution on the victim's workstation, the attacker harvests credentials (browser sessions, cached domain tokens, SSH keys), moves laterally, or establishes C2. If the victim is a domain admin, IT operator, or executive, this single hop can lead to domain compromise, data exfiltration, or supply-chain pivot. In a large meeting (all-hands, board meeting), the attacker can target multiple participants simultaneously.
Conditions required:
  • Post-exploitation tooling
  • High-value target in the meeting
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Network segmentation and zero-trust architectures limit lateral movement
  • MFA on downstream systems slows credential reuse
Detection/coverage: EDR, NDR, and SIEM correlation of anomalous post-exploitation behavior originating from Zoom.exe / zoom process
03 · Intelligence Metadata

The supporting signals.

In-the-Wild ExploitationNo confirmed in-the-wild exploitation as of 2026-08-12. Not listed on CISA KEV.
PoC AvailabilityPrivate exploit confirmed. Idan Levcovich (A Security) achieved working RCE within 24 hours of discovery (June 9, 2026). No public PoC on GitHub or exploit-db yet.
EPSS0.00409 (approximately 96th percentile) — low but rising; score will likely increase as coverage and attention grow post-disclosure.
KEV StatusNot listed as of 2026-08-12. Given the zero-click nature, KEV listing is plausible if exploitation is observed.
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H — Vendor-assigned. AC:H and UI:R are arguably overgenerous; CVSS 4.0 assessment by researcher is 9.0.
Affected VersionsZoom Workplace (all platforms) < 7.1.5 / < 7.0.6, VDI Client < 7.0.11 / < 6.6.16, Rooms < 7.1.5, Meeting SDK < 7.1.5
Fixed VersionsWorkplace 7.1.5 (current branch) or 7.0.6 (LTS), VDI Client 7.0.11 or 6.6.16, Rooms 7.1.5, Meeting SDK 7.1.5
Exposure FootprintZoom holds 55% videoconferencing market share with 300M+ daily active users and 265,000+ enterprise customers. Near-universal enterprise deployment.
Disclosure Date2026-08-11 (Zoom security bulletin ZSB-26015). Discovered by A Security on 2026-06-08.
ResearcherIdan Levcovich, Senior Vulnerability Researcher at A Security (Ⓐ Security). Branded as *Zoomsday*.
04 · The Call

noisgate verdict.

Final Verdict
UPGRADED to CRITICAL (9.0/10)

Zero-click, cross-platform RCE with a confirmed private exploit against a client installed on 300 million+ daily endpoints is the decisive factor. The vendor's AC:H and UI:R modifiers do not reflect the practical attack surface — being present in a Zoom meeting during screen sharing is default enterprise behavior, not a meaningful friction point.

HIGH Vulnerability existence and zero-click RCE capability confirmed by researcher
MEDIUM Reliable cross-platform exploitation in hardened enterprise environments
LOW Timeline to public PoC or in-the-wild exploitation

Why this verdict

  • Zero-click attack surface: The victim needs only to be in a Zoom meeting where screen sharing is active. No click, no prompt, no visual indicator. This is the default state of most business meetings.
  • Ubiquitous deployment eliminates targeting friction: With 300M+ daily users and 55% market share, the affected client is on virtually every corporate endpoint — from intern laptops to CEO workstations to domain admin machines. The attacker chooses their target by choosing which meeting to join.
  • Confirmed private weaponization: A Security achieved working RCE within 24 hours of discovery. The gap between advisory publication and public PoC is typically days to weeks for bugs of this profile. The clock is ticking.
  • Cross-platform blast radius: Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, and Android are all affected. A single exploit chain concept applies across the entire fleet — no platform is a safe harbor.
  • Role multiplier: Zoom is not itself a high-value-role component, but it runs on *every* high-value endpoint. Domain admins, backup operators, CI/CD engineers, and executives all use Zoom daily. A targeted attack during an IT team standup or board meeting puts the attacker one hop from domain controllers, backup infrastructure, or strategic data. The Zoom VDI Client specifically runs in virtual desktop infrastructure where compromise can pivot into the hypervisor management plane. The blast radius is effectively host→domain→fleet for any meeting containing a privileged user, which is the majority of IT and leadership meetings.

Why not higher?

This is already rated CRITICAL at 9.0. A 10.0 would require wormable, no-authentication, no-meeting-presence exploitation — e.g., a listening service exploitable from the internet. The meeting-presence requirement, while low-friction, is a real gate that prevents fully autonomous propagation.

Why not lower?

Downgrading below CRITICAL would require dismissing the zero-click nature, the confirmed private exploit, and the near-universal enterprise install base. The AC:H in the vendor vector is contradicted by the researcher's 24-hour exploit development timeline. The UI:R is effectively 'be in a meeting,' which is what Zoom is for. No single friction point narrows the reachable population below the threshold for CRITICAL.

05 · Compensating Control

What to do — in priority order.

  1. Disable annotation in Zoom admin console immediately — In the Zoom Admin Portal → Settings → In Meeting (Basic), disable Annotation. This removes the attack surface entirely by preventing the annotation PDU channel from being established. Deploy within the noisgate mitigation SLA of 3 days for CRITICAL findings. This is the single highest-impact control.
  2. Enforce waiting rooms and meeting passcodes — Prevent unauthorized participants from joining meetings. In admin settings, require Waiting Room and Passcode for all meetings. This adds a gate at Step 1 of the attack path. Already a best practice but now a security-critical control.
  3. Restrict screen sharing to host-only where feasible — Limiting screen sharing to hosts reduces the attacker's ability to self-initiate the annotation channel. Configure via admin policy. Note: this does NOT fully mitigate — a legitimate host sharing screen still exposes viewers.
  4. Push auto-update or force minimum version via MDM — Use your MDM (Intune, Jamf, SCCM) to enforce Zoom Workplace ≥ 7.1.5 or ≥ 7.0.6 LTS. Set the minimum allowed version to block older clients from launching. For VDI, push 7.0.11 / 6.6.16 through your VDI image pipeline.
  5. Monitor for anomalous Zoom process behavior via EDR — Create detection rules for Zoom spawning unexpected child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, /bin/sh, python), writing to temp directories, or making unusual network connections. This catches post-exploitation but not the initial overflow.
What doesn't work
  • Network-level inspection of Zoom traffic — Zoom uses TLS-encrypted proprietary protocols. Inline inspection or IDS signatures cannot see the annotation PDU contents without breaking the connection.
  • Web Application Firewalls (WAF) — the attack vector is a native desktop client protocol, not HTTP. WAF rules are irrelevant.
  • Zoom's built-in 'Report a user' feature — the exploit leaves no visual trace for the victim. They won't know to report anything.
  • Disabling Zoom Phone or Zoom Webinars only — the vulnerability is in the core meeting annotation feature present in all Zoom Workplace clients, not in add-on products.
06 · Verification

Crowdsourced verification payload.

Run on each Windows endpoint (or via your RMM/MDM script runner) with standard user privileges. For macOS/Linux, adapt the version check path. Example: powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\Check-ZoomCVE202653413.ps1

noisgate-verify.ps1
POWERSHELLREAD-ONLYSAFE
#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
# Check-ZoomCVE202653413.ps1
# Checks whether installed Zoom Workplace client is vulnerable to CVE-2026-53413
# Exit codes: 1 = VULNERABLE, 0 = PATCHED, 2 = UNKNOWN

$FixedVersionMain = [version]'7.1.5'
$FixedVersionLTS  = [version]'7.0.6'

function Get-ZoomVersion {
    # Try registry (per-user and per-machine)
    $regPaths = @(
        'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*',
        'HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*',
        'HKLM:\Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*'
    )
    foreach ($path in $regPaths) {
        $entries = Get-ItemProperty -Path $path -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
            Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -match 'Zoom Workplace|Zoom Meeting' }
        if ($entries) {
            return [version]($entries[0].DisplayVersion -replace '[^0-9.]','')
        }
    }
    # Fallback: check file version of Zoom.exe
    $zoomExe = "$env:APPDATA\Zoom\bin\Zoom.exe"
    if (Test-Path $zoomExe) {
        $fv = (Get-Item $zoomExe).VersionInfo.ProductVersion
        return [version]($fv -replace '[^0-9.]','')
    }
    return $null
}

$ver = Get-ZoomVersion

if (-not $ver) {
    Write-Output 'UNKNOWN - Zoom Workplace not detected on this host.'
    exit 2
}

Write-Output "Detected Zoom version: $ver"

# 7.1.x branch: fixed in 7.1.5+
if ($ver.Major -eq 7 -and $ver.Minor -ge 1) {
    if ($ver -ge $FixedVersionMain) {
        Write-Output 'PATCHED - Zoom version is >= 7.1.5.'
        exit 0
    } else {
        Write-Output 'VULNERABLE - Zoom 7.1.x below 7.1.5. Update immediately.'
        exit 1
    }
}

# 7.0.x branch (LTS): fixed in 7.0.6+
if ($ver.Major -eq 7 -and $ver.Minor -eq 0) {
    if ($ver -ge $FixedVersionLTS) {
        Write-Output 'PATCHED - Zoom version is >= 7.0.6 (LTS).'
        exit 0
    } else {
        Write-Output 'VULNERABLE - Zoom 7.0.x below 7.0.6. Update immediately.'
        exit 1
    }
}

# Anything older than 7.0 is vulnerable
if ($ver -lt [version]'7.0.0') {
    Write-Output 'VULNERABLE - Zoom version predates all fixed branches. Update immediately.'
    exit 1
}

Write-Output "UNKNOWN - Unexpected version $ver. Verify manually."
exit 2
07 · Bottom Line

If you remember one thing.

TL;DR
Monday morning, disable Zoom's Annotation feature fleet-wide via the admin console — this is a 5-minute change that eliminates the attack surface entirely and buys time for patching. Under the noisgate mitigation SLA for CRITICAL, compensating controls must be in place within 3 days (by August 15). Simultaneously, begin pushing Zoom Workplace 7.1.5 (or 7.0.6 LTS) through your MDM/SCCM pipeline to all Windows, macOS, and Linux endpoints; coordinate with your VDI team to update VDI Client to 7.0.11 or 6.6.16 and Rooms to 7.1.5. The noisgate remediation SLA gives you 90 days to complete full patching, but given the zero-click RCE nature and the likelihood of a public PoC emerging within days, treat this as a race — aim to have 95% of endpoints patched within 2 weeks. If you cannot patch mobile clients quickly, disable annotation on mobile via MDM policy as a stopgap. This is the most dangerous Zoom vulnerability in years; do not wait for KEV listing to act.

Sources

  1. A Security — Zoomsday Technical Writeup
  2. SecurityWeek — Zoom Patches Zero-Click Code Execution Vulnerability
  3. The Hacker News — Zoom Annotation Flaws Could Let a Meeting Participant Hijack Another Attendee's Client
  4. Security Affairs — Zoom Patches Zoomsday Zero-Click Flaw
  5. CyberInsider — Zoom Zero-Click Flaw Allowed RCE Attacks During Meetings
  6. CybersecurityNews — Zoom Zero-Click Vulnerabilities Allow Meeting Participants to Hijack Devices
  7. CVE Record — CVE-2026-53413
  8. Tenable — Zoom Workplace VDI Client Vulnerability ZSB-26015
Peer Review

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Validation Results

Crowdsourced verification outputs.

Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.