A booby-trapped PDF that only detonates when the user clicks 'reset form'
CVE-2026-57256 is a use-after-free (CWE-416) in Foxit PDF Reader/Editor's JavaScript engine. When a crafted PDF's embedded JavaScript performs abnormal operations against a list box form field, and the form is subsequently reset, the freed object is reused — attackers who groom the heap correctly can pivot to arbitrary code execution in the context of the logged-in user. Affected builds are Foxit PDF Reader ≤ 2026.1.1.36485 and matching Foxit PDF Editor branches; fixed in Reader/Editor 2026.1.2 and Editor 14.0.5.
The vendor label of HIGH (7.8) is fair on paper — CVSS scores local execution with user interaction and full CIA impact. In practice this is a *client-side* browser-class RCE with a narrow trigger (JavaScript must run inside the PDF viewer and hit the reset-form path). It's real, but it is not a wormable server bug and there is no public exploitation. MEDIUM is the operational read for a fleet manager.
4 steps from start to impact.
Deliver the malicious PDF
pdfrw, qpdf, or custom toolchains built on Peepdf/Origami).- Attacker can reach the mailbox, web download path, or shared drive
- Victim uses Foxit Reader/Editor as the default PDF handler
- Secure email gateways (Proofpoint, Mimecast, M365 ATP) strip or sandbox active PDFs
- Many enterprises default to Adobe Reader or Edge's built-in viewer, not Foxit
.pdf from browser/mail child processesUser opens the PDF and JavaScript executes
- User interaction — opening the file
- JavaScript enabled in Foxit (default)
- Protected View / Safe Reading Mode does not block form scripts
- Safe Reading Mode is on by default in current Foxit builds and gates external actions
- Some orgs disable Acrobat/Foxit JavaScript by policy
- AppLocker / WDAC may restrict Foxit spawning children
FoxitPDFReader.exe spawning cmd.exe/rundll32/powershell is a strong IOCTrigger the UAF via form reset
resetForm (or triggers an action that resets the form) after the list box has been abnormally manipulated. The reset frees the underlying list box object, but a dangling reference is reused — yielding a controlled use-after-free primitive in the renderer heap.- Heap layout groomed as required by the exploit
- Reset path reachable without an intermediate crash
- Modern Windows heap hardening (LFH randomization, segment heap) makes reliable grooming version-specific
- ASLR + CFG raise the bar for turning UAF into code exec
WER referencing FoxitPDFReader.exe with c0000005 on Foxit's JS worker threadAchieve arbitrary code execution as the user
Cobalt Strike, Sliver, NimPlant) from an attacker C2.- Working exploit for the specific Foxit build and Windows version
- Outbound network egress for the second stage
- EDR (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Defender for Endpoint) heavily instruments PDF-viewer children
- Egress filtering / proxy inspection breaks unknown C2 domains
The supporting signals.
| In-the-wild exploitation | None observed as of 2026-07-10. Not on CISA KEV. |
|---|---|
| Public PoC | No public PoC published. Vendor advisory credits the reporter via ZDI-style coordinated disclosure; no working exploit on GitHub. |
| EPSS | 0.00116 (~0.12%) — bottom quartile of exploit-prediction probability. |
| KEV status | Not listed. |
| CVSS 3.1 vector | AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H → local attack vector, user interaction required, full CIA impact in user context. |
| Affected versions | Foxit PDF Reader ≤ 2026.1.1.36485; Foxit PDF Editor 2026.1.1.36485 and prior 14.x branches. |
| Fixed versions | Foxit PDF Reader 2026.1.2, Foxit PDF Editor 2026.1.2, Foxit PDF Editor 14.0.5. |
| Exposure telemetry | Client-side software — not indexed by Shodan/Censys. Enterprise install base is meaningful but a minority of the PDF-viewer market versus Adobe and browser-embedded viewers. |
| Disclosed | 2026-07-08 by Foxit security bulletin, batched with ~19 other UAF CVEs in the same patch cycle. |
| Root cause class | CWE-416 use-after-free in JavaScript-driven form field manipulation — same bug class as CVE-2026-13126 sibling batch. |
noisgate verdict.
MEDIUM reflects the single most decisive factor: exploitation requires a user to open an attacker-supplied PDF in Foxit specifically with JavaScript enabled, and there is no in-the-wild exploitation or public PoC. Blast radius is capped at the interactive user's token — no lateral primitive, no server exposure, no high-value-role component in scope.
Why this verdict
- User interaction required (UI:R) — the chain does not start until the victim opens the file in Foxit. Every mail gateway, browser download warning, and Safe Reading Mode gate is an independent choke point.
- Local attack vector (AV:L) — no network-reachable service, no unauthenticated server surface. Attacker has to reach the desktop through a delivery channel that most enterprises already inspect.
- EPSS 0.00116, no KEV, no public PoC — real-world weaponization probability is low; this is a patch-cycle bug, not a fire drill.
- Blast radius = user token — no privilege escalation primitive, no domain identity theft, no fleet pivot. A compromised endpoint is bad but recoverable.
- Role multiplier: Foxit Reader/Editor is a desktop productivity tool. There is no realistic high-value-role deployment — it does not run on domain controllers, hypervisors, IdPs, CI runners, or edge appliances. The high-value-role floor does not apply.
- Market share friction: Foxit is a minority PDF viewer in most enterprises; Adobe, Edge, and Chrome cover the majority. Attacker must first ascertain the victim uses Foxit, which lowers targeting yield.
Why not higher?
HIGH would require either active exploitation, a network-reachable trigger, or a plausible high-value-role deployment. None apply — this is a client-side UAF gated by user interaction and JavaScript being enabled, with no KEV entry and negligible EPSS.
Why not lower?
LOW/IGNORE would ignore that this is a confirmed RCE primitive in a real enterprise-deployed product, not a theoretical crash. Client-side PDF UAFs are historically used by commercial spyware vendors (NSO, Intellexa) and access brokers; the vendor patch is genuine and the bug is real, so it earns a real remediation window.
What to do — in priority order.
- Disable JavaScript in Foxit Reader/Editor by GPO — Kills the JavaScript execution prerequisite in step 2 of the chain. Push
HKCU\Software\Foxit Software\Foxit PDF Reader\Preferences\JavaScript = 0via GPO or Intune. Deploy across the fleet — no mitigation SLA is enforced for MEDIUM, but this is a one-line change worth shipping within the current sprint. - Force Safe Reading Mode enabled and locked — Safe Reading Mode blocks unauthorized external actions and script triggers. Set
SafeReadingMode = 1and lock the preference so users cannot toggle it off. - Route PDF opens through the browser or Adobe Reader default — For orgs that don't require Foxit's editor features, changing the default
.pdfhandler to Microsoft Edge or Adobe Reader entirely sidesteps this CVE class. UseSet Default ProgramsGPO. - Tighten mail attachment policy — Have the SEG (Proofpoint/Mimecast/Defender for O365) sandbox or strip PDFs with embedded JavaScript. Most gateways offer a
PDF with active contentverdict — flip it to quarantine. - EDR rule: alert on Foxit spawning shells — Write a detection for
FoxitPDFReader.exe/FoxitPDFEditor.exespawningcmd.exe,powershell.exe,rundll32.exe,wscript.exe,mshta.exe. Trivial to write in CrowdStrike CQL / Defender AH; catches successful exploitation immediately.
- Perimeter firewalls / WAFs — the trigger is a local file open, not a network request. Egress filtering only helps at stage-2 loader retrieval.
- MFA — no authentication surface is involved; MFA is orthogonal to a client-side memory bug.
- Patching Adobe Reader — same class of bug in a different product; does not affect Foxit's codebase.
- DEP/ASLR alone — modern exploit chains routinely bypass both; do not rely on OS mitigations as the sole control.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run on a Windows target host as a standard or admin user. Invoke with .\Check-Foxit-CVE-2026-57256.ps1. It inspects installed Foxit Reader/Editor versions from the registry and compares against the fixed builds.
#requires -Version 5.1
# Check-Foxit-CVE-2026-57256.ps1
# Reports VULNERABLE / PATCHED / UNKNOWN for CVE-2026-57256 (Foxit UAF).
# Fixed builds: Reader 2026.1.2, Editor 2026.1.2, Editor 14.0.5
$ErrorActionPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
$vulnBuildMax = [Version]'2026.1.1.36485'
$fixedReader = [Version]'2026.1.2.0'
$fixedEditor = [Version]'2026.1.2.0'
$fixedEditor14= [Version]'14.0.5.0'
$paths = @(
'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*',
'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*',
'HKCU:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\*'
)
$found = @()
foreach ($p in $paths) {
Get-ItemProperty $p 2>$null | Where-Object {
$_.DisplayName -match 'Foxit\s+(PDF\s+)?(Reader|Editor|PhantomPDF)'
} | ForEach-Object {
$found += [PSCustomObject]@{
Name = $_.DisplayName
Version = $_.DisplayVersion
}
}
}
if (-not $found) {
Write-Output 'UNKNOWN: Foxit not detected on this host.'
exit 2
}
$verdict = 'PATCHED'
foreach ($f in $found) {
try { $v = [Version]$f.Version } catch { $v = $null }
if (-not $v) { Write-Output "UNKNOWN: $($f.Name) version $($f.Version) unparseable."; $verdict = 'UNKNOWN'; continue }
$isReader = $f.Name -match 'Reader'
$isEditor14 = ($f.Name -match 'Editor|PhantomPDF') -and $v.Major -eq 14
$isEditor2026 = ($f.Name -match 'Editor|PhantomPDF') -and $v.Major -eq 2026
$vuln = $false
if ($isReader -and $v -lt $fixedReader) { $vuln = $true }
if ($isEditor2026 -and $v -lt $fixedEditor) { $vuln = $true }
if ($isEditor14 -and $v -lt $fixedEditor14) { $vuln = $true }
if ($vuln) {
Write-Output "VULNERABLE: $($f.Name) $($f.Version)"
$verdict = 'VULNERABLE'
} else {
Write-Output "PATCHED: $($f.Name) $($f.Version)"
}
}
switch ($verdict) {
'VULNERABLE' { exit 1 }
'PATCHED' { exit 0 }
default { exit 2 }
}
If you remember one thing.
Sources
- Foxit Security Bulletins
- GBHackers — Foxit Patches Multiple UAF Flaws Leading to RCE
- CybersecurityNews — 20 RCE Vulnerabilities Patched in Foxit PDF Reader/Editor
- Tenable Nessus plugin — Foxit PDF Reader < 2026.1.1 Multiple Vulnerabilities
- Cyberpress — Foxit Patches PDF Reader Editor Vulnerabilities in 2026.1.2
- CVE Details — Foxit PDF Reader vulnerabilities
- OpenCVE — Foxit PDF Editor CVEs
- THREATINT — CVE-2026-57256
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.