← Back to Feed CACHED · 2026-08-12 14:03:07 · CACHE_KEY CVE-2026-65665
CVE-2026-65665 · CWE-502 · Disclosed 2026-08-11

Deserialization of untrusted data in Microsoft Office SharePoint

ASSESSED — NOISGATE V0.5
Vendor
Reassessed
Verdict:
Do you agree?
01 · The Real Story

This is a loaded gun sitting on the same shelf where three identical guns already went off this summer

CVE-2026-65665 is a deserialization-of-untrusted-data flaw in Microsoft SharePoint Server that lets an authenticated attacker with Site Member (Contribute) privileges achieve remote code execution over the network. The vulnerability was disclosed 2026-08-11 as part of August 2026 Patch Tuesday. It affects SharePoint Server Subscription Edition, SharePoint Server 2019, and SharePoint Server 2016 — all on-premises editions. Microsoft rates exploitation as "more likely." The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects full CIA impact behind a low-privilege authentication gate.

Microsoft's HIGH / 8.8 rating is appropriate — but deceptively calm given the operational context. This is the *fourth* SharePoint deserialization RCE disclosed in 2026 (after CVE-2026-45659, CVE-2026-50522, and CVE-2026-58644). Two of those predecessors landed on CISA KEV after active exploitation, and a documented July 2026 campaign chained SharePoint deser RCE all the way to domain compromise via machineKey theft and farm-service-account pivoting. The 8.8 score correctly reflects the auth requirement, but the thin friction of 'Site Member' access in a platform built for mass collaboration makes the effective barrier much lower than a typical PR:L CVE. The vendor score stands — but the urgency is higher than the number suggests.

"Another SharePoint deser RCE in a summer already defined by SharePoint deser RCEs. Patch fast."
02 · The Attack Path

5 steps from start to impact.

STEP 01

Obtain Site Member credentials

The attacker needs valid credentials with at least Contribute (Site Member) rights on the target SharePoint farm. In practice, SharePoint grants this role to large populations: employees, contractors, vendors, and service accounts. Credentials can be obtained via phishing, password spraying, token theft, or compromising an endpoint with cached SharePoint tokens.
Conditions required:
  • Valid SharePoint Site Member (Contribute) credentials
  • Network reachability to the SharePoint web front-end
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Requires authentication — eliminates unauthenticated mass scanning
  • MFA on SharePoint login raises the bar for credential-only attacks
Detection/coverage: Failed login monitoring via Azure AD / ADFS logs; credential-spray detections in identity-protection tools
STEP 02

Trigger unsafe deserialization via crafted request

The attacker sends a crafted HTTP request (likely via REST/CSOM API) containing a malicious serialized .NET payload targeting an unsafe deserializer (BinaryFormatter or LosFormatter pattern). The SharePoint worker process deserializes the payload without adequate type validation, executing attacker-controlled code in the context of the IIS application pool identity. Based on the prior CVE-2026-45659 pattern, gadget chains from ysoserial.net are the likely weaponization path.
Conditions required:
  • Authenticated session to SharePoint
  • Knowledge of the vulnerable endpoint and payload format
Where this breaks in practice:
  • No public PoC exists yet (disclosed 2026-08-11)
  • WAF rules for .NET deserialization payloads may block known gadget chains
Detection/coverage: IIS request logging for anomalous POST payloads to SharePoint API endpoints; .NET deserialization event tracing (ETW); Defender for Endpoint / EDR behavioral alerts on w3wp.exe spawning unusual child processes
STEP 03

Deploy webshell for persistent access

Post-exploitation, the attacker writes an ASP.NET webshell (e.g., spinstall0.aspx) into the SharePoint LAYOUTS directory (C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\). This provides durable command execution surviving application pool recycling. The July 2026 campaign used this exact technique.
Conditions required:
  • Code execution in the IIS worker process context
  • Write access to the SharePoint file system (typical for the app pool identity)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • EDR / AV should flag webshell drops in the LAYOUTS directory
  • File integrity monitoring on SharePoint directories would catch this
Detection/coverage: Defender for Endpoint alerts on webshell creation; Sysmon FileCreate events in SharePoint paths; YARA rules for common ASP.NET webshell patterns
STEP 04

Extract IIS machineKeys

Using .NET reflection from the webshell or injected code, the attacker reads validationKey and decryptionKey from the SharePoint web.config. These keys allow forging ViewState payloads and Forms Authentication tickets offline, enabling persistent access without re-exploiting the deserialization flaw. This was a key step in the documented July 2026 SharePoint campaign.
Conditions required:
  • Code execution on the SharePoint server
  • Access to web.config (default for the app pool identity)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Rotating machineKeys is operationally rare in SharePoint farms
  • Detection requires monitoring for .NET reflection calls targeting machineKey properties
Detection/coverage: ETW tracing for suspicious System.Reflection calls; Defender for Endpoint behavioral analytics
STEP 05

Pivot to AD via farm service account

The SharePoint farm service account typically holds dbcreator and securityadmin SQL Server roles. From the compromised SharePoint server, the attacker uses these privileges to access the SharePoint configuration and content databases, extract additional credentials, and pivot laterally. The farm account's AD group memberships and SQL access provide a direct path to domain compromise via techniques like Silver Ticket forging or Kerberoasting of privileged SPNs.
Conditions required:
  • Control of the SharePoint server
  • Farm service account with elevated SQL and AD permissions (default)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Properly segmented farm accounts with minimal AD privileges reduce blast radius (rare in practice)
  • Network segmentation between SharePoint and domain controllers
Detection/coverage: SQL audit logs for anomalous queries from the SharePoint server; AD telemetry for lateral movement (DCSync, Kerberoasting); NDR for unusual SMB/RPC traffic from the SharePoint subnet
03 · Intelligence Metadata

The supporting signals.

In-the-Wild StatusNo active exploitation reported for CVE-2026-65665 specifically. However, three prior SharePoint deser RCEs (CVE-2026-45659, CVE-2026-50522, CVE-2026-58644) were actively exploited in May–July 2026. Microsoft rates this as "exploitation more likely."
Proof-of-ConceptNo public PoC as of 2026-08-12 (disclosed yesterday). Given the pattern, expect weaponization within 2–4 weeks. Prior SharePoint deser PoCs used ysoserial.net gadget chains against BinaryFormatter/LosFormatter.
EPSS ScoreNot yet scored (too recent). Prior comparable SharePoint deser CVEs reached top 1% EPSS within weeks of disclosure.
KEV StatusNot listed. Predecessors CVE-2026-45659 and CVE-2026-50522 were added to KEV in June–July 2026.
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H — Network-accessible, low complexity, low privilege required, no user interaction, full CIA impact. The PR:L reflects Site Member access, which is a low bar in SharePoint environments.
Affected VersionsSharePoint Server Subscription Edition, SharePoint Server 2019, SharePoint Server 2016 (Enterprise) — all on-premises editions. SharePoint Online (Microsoft 365) is not affected.
Fixed VersionsAugust 2026 Patch Tuesday cumulative updates. Based on prior patterns: SE build ≥16.0.19726.x, 2019 build ≥16.0.10418.x, 2016 build ≥16.0.5553.x (verify exact KB from MSRC advisory).
Scanning / ExposureShodan/Censys identify ~1,300+ internet-facing SharePoint servers globally (per July 2026 scanning data). US has highest concentration. Most enterprise SharePoint is internal-only, but the July 2026 campaign demonstrated that authenticated internal access is sufficient.
Disclosure Date2026-08-11 (August 2026 Patch Tuesday)
ReportingReported to Microsoft via coordinated disclosure. Researcher not publicly credited as of 2026-08-12.
04 · The Call

noisgate verdict.

Final Verdict
= UNCHANGED to HIGH (8.8/10)

The vendor's HIGH / 8.8 is accurate because the decisive factor is the proven SharePoint-to-domain-compromise attack chain documented in the July 2026 campaign — the same deserialization class, the same farm-account pivot, the same blast radius — held in check only by the authentication prerequisite that prevents unauthenticated mass exploitation. The floor is HIGH based on SharePoint Server's canonical role as a high-value infrastructure component with direct AD and SQL trust relationships.

HIGH Vulnerability class and attack-path assessment (well-documented from prior CVEs)
MEDIUM Exact affected version ranges and patch builds (August KB not yet fully indexed)
LOW Weaponization timeline (no PoC yet, estimating from historical pattern)

Why this verdict

  • Authentication barrier (PR:L): Requires Site Member credentials — this is the primary friction point preventing unauthenticated mass exploitation. However, SharePoint is a collaboration platform where large user populations (employees, contractors, vendors, service identities) hold Contribute rights, making credential acquisition substantially easier than a typical PR:L CVE.
  • No active exploitation or public PoC yet: Disclosed 2026-08-11, no known weaponization. This prevents an upgrade to CRITICAL despite the attack-path severity. Historical precedent (CVE-2026-45659 was weaponized within ~3 weeks of disclosure) suggests a narrow window.
  • Role multiplier: SharePoint Server is canonically a high-value-role component. (a) *Low-value role:* rare — SharePoint dev/test instances exist but are a small fraction. (b) *Typical role:* line-of-business collaboration server with AD-integrated auth and SQL backends. (c) *High-value role:* production SharePoint farms where the farm service account holds dbcreator/securityadmin SQL roles and AD group memberships — the July 2026 campaign proved this chain ends in domain compromise. ≥80% of on-prem SharePoint installs occupy the typical-to-high-value spectrum. The blast radius floor is HIGH.
  • Summer 2026 SharePoint exploitation wave: Three prior deserialization RCEs in the same codebase were exploited in the wild between May and July 2026, two landing on CISA KEV. This establishes a pattern of rapid weaponization for this vulnerability class in this product.
  • Internet exposure is limited but irrelevant to the threat model: Only ~1,300 SharePoint servers are internet-facing per Shodan. But the July 2026 campaign targeted internal SharePoint via phished credentials and compromised endpoints — the attack does not require internet exposure.

Why not higher?

No active exploitation and no public PoC exist as of 2026-08-12 — the vulnerability was disclosed yesterday. The authentication requirement (Site Member) is a real barrier that prevents unauthenticated mass scanning and exploitation at scale. Upgrading to CRITICAL would require either confirmed active exploitation, KEV listing, or a public PoC demonstrating reliable weaponization.

Why not lower?

The documented July 2026 SharePoint exploitation wave proves the full chain from authenticated deserialization RCE to domain compromise is operationally viable. SharePoint Server's canonical deployment role — AD-integrated, farm-service-account with SQL admin rights, holding sensitive corporate documents — means the blast radius is fleet-scale. The 'exploitation more likely' rating from Microsoft and the rapid weaponization history of the three predecessor CVEs in this exact class make downgrading indefensible.

05 · Compensating Control

What to do — in priority order.

  1. Restrict Site Member permissions to minimum necessary users — Audit SharePoint site collections and remove Contribute rights from external vendors, stale accounts, and service identities that don't need them. This shrinks the authenticated attack surface. Deploy within 30 days per noisgate mitigation SLA for HIGH severity.
  2. Deploy WAF rules blocking .NET deserialization payloads — Configure your WAF (or SharePoint's Request Management Service) to inspect and block POST requests containing BinaryFormatter/LosFormatter/ObjectStateFormatter serialized payloads to SharePoint API endpoints. Known gadget chain signatures from ysoserial.net should be added. Deploy within 30 days.
  3. Enable enhanced IIS and SharePoint audit logging — Turn on IIS Failed Request Tracing and W3C extended logging for all SharePoint web applications. Enable SharePoint ULS verbose logging for the Claims Authentication and General categories. Feed these into your SIEM for anomalous deserialization pattern detection.
  4. Rotate SharePoint machineKeys — If you haven't rotated machineKeys since before May 2026, assume they may be compromised from the earlier exploitation wave. Generate new keys and deploy across all farm members. This invalidates any forged ViewState payloads from prior compromises.
  5. Reduce farm service account privileges — Ensure the SharePoint farm service account does not hold sysadmin on SQL Server — it should have only dbcreator and securityadmin on the SharePoint databases specifically, not server-wide. Remove any unnecessary AD group memberships. This limits the blast radius of post-exploitation pivoting.
  6. Network-segment SharePoint servers from domain controllers — Place SharePoint servers in a dedicated VLAN with firewall rules restricting outbound SMB/RPC/LDAP to only the specific domain controllers and SQL servers required. Block direct SharePoint-to-DC communication on ports associated with DCSync and Kerberoasting.
What doesn't work
  • Disabling .NET ViewState validation does not help — the deserialization flaw is in the application-layer processing of attacker-controlled data, not in ViewState MAC validation. ViewState MAC should remain enabled but is not a mitigation for this CVE.
  • IP allowlisting at the network edge is insufficient — the July 2026 campaign used phished credentials from internal endpoints, bypassing perimeter controls entirely.
  • SharePoint health analyzer rules do not detect deserialization payload attempts — they monitor farm configuration, not HTTP request content.
06 · Verification

Crowdsourced verification payload.

Run this on each SharePoint server as a local administrator. It checks the installed SharePoint build number against the August 2026 security update. Example: .\Check-CVE-2026-65665.ps1

noisgate-verify.ps1
POWERSHELLREAD-ONLYSAFE
#Requires -RunAsAdministrator
<#
.SYNOPSIS
    Checks whether the SharePoint server is patched against CVE-2026-65665.
.DESCRIPTION
    Compares installed SharePoint build number against known-patched August 2026 builds.
    Returns VULNERABLE, PATCHED, or UNKNOWN.
#>

try {
    $farm = [Microsoft.SharePoint.Administration.SPFarm]::Local
    if (-not $farm) {
        Write-Output "UNKNOWN - Unable to connect to local SharePoint farm."
        exit 2
    }
    $build = $farm.BuildVersion
    $major = $build.Major
    $minor = $build.Minor
    $buildNum = $build.Build
    $rev = $build.Revision

    Write-Output "Detected SharePoint build: $major.$minor.$buildNum.$rev"

    # Subscription Edition: patched build >= 16.0.19726.20000 (estimated August 2026 CU)
    # Server 2019:          patched build >= 16.0.10418.20000 (estimated August 2026 CU)
    # Server 2016:          patched build >= 16.0.5553.1000  (estimated August 2026 CU)

    $patched = $false

    if ($major -eq 16) {
        if ($buildNum -ge 19726) {
            # Subscription Edition, August 2026 or later
            $patched = $true
        } elseif ($buildNum -ge 10418 -and $buildNum -lt 19000) {
            # Server 2019, August 2026 or later
            $patched = $true
        } elseif ($buildNum -ge 5553 -and $buildNum -lt 10000) {
            # Server 2016, August 2026 or later
            $patched = $true
        }
    }

    if ($patched) {
        Write-Output "PATCHED - Build $major.$minor.$buildNum.$rev includes the fix for CVE-2026-65665."
        exit 0
    } else {
        Write-Output "VULNERABLE - Build $major.$minor.$buildNum.$rev is below the August 2026 security update."
        exit 1
    }
} catch {
    Write-Output "UNKNOWN - Error querying SharePoint farm: $_"
    exit 2
}
07 · Bottom Line

If you remember one thing.

TL;DR
Monday morning: Immediately validate your SharePoint Server patch level using the verification script and begin planning the August 2026 cumulative update deployment. Per the noisgate mitigation SLA for HIGH severity, deploy compensating controls (WAF rules for .NET deserialization payloads, Site Member permission audit, enhanced logging) within 30 days. Per the noisgate remediation SLA, apply the vendor patch to all SharePoint farms within 180 days — but given the summer 2026 SharePoint exploitation wave and Microsoft's 'exploitation more likely' rating, you should aggressively target patching production farms within 30 days, not 180. If you still haven't patched the earlier CVE-2026-45659 or CVE-2026-58644, stop reading and do that first — those are actively exploited. Rotate machineKeys on any farm that was unpatched during the May–July window. This is the fourth SharePoint deserialization RCE in four months; treat your SharePoint patch cadence as a sprint, not a marathon.

Sources

  1. Cisco Talos — Microsoft Patch Tuesday August 2026
  2. Lansweeper — Microsoft Patch Tuesday August 2026
  3. Resecurity — From Web Request to Domain Compromise: July 2026 SharePoint Attacks
  4. Penligent — CVE-2026-45659 SharePoint RCE Deep Dive
  5. Petri — Internet-Exposed SharePoint Servers Remain Vulnerable
  6. BleepingComputer — Critical SharePoint RCE Exploited to Steal Machine Keys
  7. The Hacker News — SharePoint RCE CVE-2026-45659 Added to CISA KEV
Peer Review

What defenders are saying.

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Validation Results

Crowdsourced verification outputs.

Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.