← Back to Feed CACHED · 2026-10-28 08:07:40 · CACHE_KEY CVE-2026-77153
CVE-2026-77153 · CWE-862 · Disclosed 2026-10-27

IBM i Host-Based Printer Subsystem missing authorization information disclosure

ASSESSED — NOISGATE
Vendor
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Reassessed
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Verdict: —
Do you agree?
01 · The Real Story

Like discovering the office copier lets anyone in the building walk up and grab someone else's print job off the tray — annoying, but the building itself is locked

CVE-2026-77153 is a missing authorization check in the Host-Based Printer Subsystem of IBM i (program 5770-SS1), affecting releases 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6. A remote, unauthenticated attacker on the network can exploit this flaw to read sensitive information from the printer subsystem — specifically, to retrieve print files they should not be able to access. The attack vector is network-based but IBM rates the attack complexity as HIGH (AC:H), meaning specific preconditions beyond simple network reachability must be met. The impact is limited: LOW confidentiality loss (partial data exposure from print queues) and LOW availability impact, with zero integrity impact. IBM published PTFs for all four supported releases on 27 October 2026, with the caveat that Access Client Solutions must be updated to version 1.1.9.15+ after applying PTFs, or Telnet printer sessions will break.

IBM rates this MEDIUM at CVSS 4.8, and that assessment is reasonable and accurate. The vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L correctly captures the narrow blast radius: you can leak some print spool data, not compromise the entire LPAR. The 'unauthenticated' tag sounds alarming, but the HIGH attack complexity and the fact that IBM i systems are virtually never internet-facing (they are internal back-office workhorses for ERP, financials, and manufacturing) mean the practical risk to most enterprises is modest. An attacker already needs internal network position to reach the printer subsystem's TCP services. There are no known PoCs, no exploitation in the wild, and CISA has not added this to KEV.

"IBM i printer auth bypass leaks files but requires internal access and high complexity"
02 · The Attack Path

3 steps from start to impact.

STEP 01

Gain internal network access

The attacker must first achieve a position on the internal network where the IBM i LPAR's printer subsystem ports are reachable. IBM i systems are overwhelmingly deployed on private LANs with no internet-facing services on the printer subsystem. This means the attacker is already post-initial-access — they have compromised a workstation, VPN credential, or other internal pivot point.
Conditions required:
  • Internal network access to the IBM i LPAR's segment
  • TCP reachability to the host-based printer subsystem ports (commonly 9100, 515, or 5001 depending on configuration)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • IBM i systems are not internet-facing by design; Halo Security and IBM both characterize public exposure as non-standard
  • Enterprise networks typically segment IBM i into restricted VLANs behind ACLs
  • Estimated ~110,000 organizations run IBM i globally, but far fewer expose printer subsystem ports beyond the print server subnet
Detection/coverage: Network IDS rules for unexpected connections to IBM i printer ports from non-print-server hosts; SIEM correlation of TCP 9100/515 connections to IBM i LPARs from unusual sources.
STEP 02

Interact with the Host-Based Printer Subsystem

The attacker sends crafted requests to the printer subsystem service. Because the authorization check is missing, the subsystem does not verify whether the requester is permitted to access the targeted print resource. The exact protocol interaction is not publicly documented in any PoC, and IBM rates the attack complexity as HIGH, implying that specific timing, configuration, or protocol-state conditions must be met — not just a single unauthenticated request.
Conditions required:
  • Knowledge of IBM i printer subsystem protocol specifics
  • Specific preconditions that elevate attack complexity to HIGH (likely configuration-dependent or timing-sensitive)
Where this breaks in practice:
  • No public PoC or exploit code exists as of 2026-10-28
  • IBM i's proprietary protocols are not well-documented for offensive use — this is a niche platform
  • The HIGH attack complexity rating suggests this is not a simple replay-and-win scenario
Detection/coverage: IBM i exit point auditing (QAUDJRN journal) can log printer access events; Host-Based Printer subsystem configuration changes are auditable via CL commands.
STEP 03

Exfiltrate sensitive print data

Upon successful exploitation, the attacker can read print spool files or output data that they should not have access to. On a production IBM i, print queues may contain financial reports, payroll data, invoices, shipping labels, or other business-critical documents. The CVSS rates this as LOW confidentiality impact (C:L), meaning the attacker gains partial, not total, access to stored information. There is also a LOW availability impact, potentially disrupting print operations.
Conditions required:
  • Active print jobs or queued spool files on the targeted printer subsystem
  • Files containing sensitive content in the print queue
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Impact is opportunistic — depends on what happens to be in the print queue at exploitation time
  • C:L means not all data on the system is accessible, just a subset of print-related files
  • No integrity impact — the attacker cannot modify data or gain persistent access
Detection/coverage: Audit journal entries for spool file access (QAUDJRN type AF); monitoring for unusual spool file reads from unexpected source addresses.
03 · Compensating Control

1
MEDIUM 4.8→LOW 2.5
SEVERITY REDUCED
Restrict printer subsystem network access via ACLs — Configure firewall rules or IBM i Communication Entries to allow only designated print server IPs to reach the host-based printer subsystem ports (typically TCP 9100, 515, 5001). This eliminates the attack surface for any host not on the authorized print server list. Since there is no noisgate mitigation SLA for MEDIUM, go straight to the 365-day remediation window, but this control should be verified as part of standard network hygiene regardless.
2
MEDIUM 4.8→MEDIUM 4.0
Enable and monitor IBM i audit journal for printer access — Configure QAUDJRN with audit level set to capture spool file access events (type AF) and printer device operations. Forward journal entries to your SIEM. This does not prevent exploitation but provides detection and forensic evidence if the vuln is exercised. Deploy within your standard monitoring onboarding cycle.
3
MEDIUM 4.8→IGNORE 0.0
SEVERITY REDUCED
Apply the vendor PTFs (SJ11502/SJ11523/SJ11524/SJ11522) — This is the definitive fix. Apply the PTF matching your IBM i release, then update Access Client Solutions to ≥ 1.1.9.15 to prevent Telnet printer session breakage. Review each PTF's cover letter for pre-installation steps. Under the noisgate remediation SLA for MEDIUM, apply within 365 days. Given this is a straightforward PTF with no reported side effects beyond the ACS version requirement, earlier is better.
What doesn't work
  • WAF / reverse proxy — The host-based printer subsystem uses proprietary IBM i protocols (LPR/LPD, raw 9100, IPDS), not HTTP. A web application firewall provides zero coverage.
  • EDR on endpoints — Traditional EDR agents do not run on IBM i LPARs. Endpoint detection on Windows/Linux workstations will not see IBM i printer subsystem traffic or exploitation.
  • TLS/encryption on print streams — While encrypting print data in transit protects confidentiality of legitimate jobs, it does not address the missing authorization check. The attacker exploits the authorization bypass, not a network sniffing vector.
04 · Intelligence Metadata

The supporting signals.

In-the-Wild ExploitationNone known. Not listed on CISA KEV. No reports of active exploitation as of 2026-10-28. Disclosed only yesterday.
Proof-of-ConceptNone available. No PoC on GitHub, ExploitDB, pocindex.io, or nuclei templates. The IBM i printer subsystem protocol is niche and poorly documented for offensive research.
EPSS ScoreNot yet scored. CVE was published 2026-10-27 — too recent for EPSS model ingestion. Expected to be very low given niche platform and no PoC.
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L — Network-reachable, high complexity, no auth required, but only low confidentiality and availability impact. The AC:H is the critical friction factor.
Affected VersionsIBM i 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 (program 5770-SS1). All currently supported IBM i releases are affected.
Fixed VersionsPTF SJ11522 (7.3), SJ11524 (7.4), SJ11523 (7.5), SJ11502 (7.6). Also requires ACS ≥ 1.1.9.15 for Telnet printer sessions.
Installed Base / Exposure~110,000–120,000 organizations run IBM i globally (Fortra marketplace estimates). Virtually none expose printer subsystem ports to the internet. Halo Security characterizes IBM i as *not designed as a public-facing internet edge device*.
Vendor SeverityIBM rates this MEDIUM (CVSS 4.8). Published in IBM Security Bulletin ibm17294253 on 2026-10-27.
Disclosure Date2026-10-27 (initial publication by IBM PSIRT)
Reporting ResearcherNot disclosed in the IBM advisory.

Sources.

  1. IBM Security Bulletin ibm17294253
  2. IBM i CVE-to-PTF Map (2026-10-28 release)
  3. Halo Security — IBM i CVE Risk Intelligence
  4. IBM i TCP/IP Port Reference
  5. IBM Docs — Configuring Host Print Transform
  6. Fortra — IBM i Marketplace Survey 2026
  7. Cisco Talos — Microsoft Patch Tuesday October 2026
  8. Exploit Intel — IBM i Vulnerability Tracker
05 · The Call

Final Verdict
= UNCHANGED to MEDIUM (4.8/10)

Why this verdict

  • IBM's CVSS 4.8 is the baseline and it is accurate. The vector correctly captures a network-reachable but high-complexity attack with limited impact. There is no reason to inflate or deflate this score.
  • Internal-only attack surface. IBM i systems are deployed on internal LANs in ~110K+ orgs worldwide. The host-based printer subsystem is a LAN-facing service. Reaching it requires prior internal network access (post-initial-access position), which compounds the friction significantly.
  • HIGH attack complexity narrows exploitability. IBM rates AC:H, meaning exploitation requires conditions beyond simple network access — likely protocol-state, timing, or configuration prerequisites. Combined with zero public PoCs and the niche, proprietary nature of the IBM i printer protocol, weaponization is realistically difficult.
  • LOW impact caps the ceiling. C:L/I:N/A:L means partial data exposure and minor service disruption. This is not RCE, not privilege escalation, not a path to LPAR compromise. The attacker reads some print spool files — they cannot pivot, persist, or escalate.
  • Role multiplier: IBM i is canonically a high-value-role component — it runs core ERP, financial, and manufacturing workloads (banks, manufacturers, retailers). However, the vulnerability's outcome on even a production LPAR is *limited information disclosure from print queues*, not system compromise, domain takeover, mass data egress, or supply-chain impact. The blast radius is host-local, confined to the printer subsystem, with C:L impact. This does not meet the HIGH floor threshold of 'domain takeover / fleet compromise / mass data egress.' Print queue leakage is a data-exposure incident, not an infrastructure-compromise event.
  • No exploitation pressure. Zero PoCs, zero in-the-wild activity, not on KEV, EPSS not yet scored but expected to be near-floor given platform obscurity.

Why not higher?

Elevating to HIGH would require either a realistic path to broader system compromise or evidence of active exploitation — neither exists. The vulnerability is confined to information disclosure from a single subsystem with LOW confidentiality impact. IBM i's internal-only deployment model and the HIGH attack complexity further limit real-world risk. Even on production IBM i LPARs running critical ERP workloads, reading print spool files does not constitute fleet-scale or domain-scale impact.

Why not lower?

Dropping to LOW would understate the risk because the vulnerability *is* remotely exploitable without authentication, and IBM i print queues on production systems can contain genuinely sensitive business data (financial reports, payroll, PII). The AC:H adds friction but does not eliminate the risk — an attacker with internal positioning and IBM i protocol knowledge could exploit this. The affected platform is universally business-critical in the orgs that run it, so even limited data exposure from print queues warrants MEDIUM priority.

06 · Verification

Crowdsourced verification payload.

Run this script from an auditor workstation with SSH access to the target IBM i LPAR. It connects via SSH, queries QSYS2.PTF_INFO for the relevant PTFs, and reports VULNERABLE/PATCHED/UNKNOWN. Requires an IBM i user profile with *AUDIT or *SECADM special authority (or at minimum read access to QSYS2.PTF_INFO). Usage: bash check_cve_2026_77153.sh ibmi-hostname.corp.local qsecofr

noisgate-verify.sh
BASHREAD-ONLYSAFE
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# CVE-2026-77153 — IBM i Host-Based Printer Subsystem Missing Authorization
# Checks whether the appropriate PTF is applied on the target IBM i LPAR.
# Usage: ./check_cve_2026_77153.sh <hostname> [ssh_user]
# Exit codes: 0=PATCHED, 1=VULNERABLE, 2=UNKNOWN

set -uo pipefail

HOST="${1:?Usage: $0 <ibmi_hostname> [ssh_user]}"
USER="${2:-qsecofr}"
TIMEOUT=15

# PTFs that fix CVE-2026-77153 by release
PTFS="SJ11522 SJ11524 SJ11523 SJ11502"
PTF_CSV=$(echo "$PTFS" | sed "s/ /','/g" | sed "s/^/'/" | sed "s/$/'/")

echo "[*] CVE-2026-77153 checker — target: ${USER}@${HOST}"
echo "[*] Querying QSYS2.PTF_INFO for PTFs: ${PTFS}"

# Use SQL services via QSH db2 utility over SSH
SQL="SELECT PTF_IDENTIFIER, PTF_IPL_ACTION, PTF_LOADED_STATUS, PTF_PRODUCT_ID FROM QSYS2.PTF_INFO WHERE PTF_IDENTIFIER IN (${PTF_CSV}) AND PTF_PRODUCT_ID = '5770SS1' AND PTF_LOADED_STATUS IN ('APPLIED','PERMANENTLY APPLIED','TEMPORARILY APPLIED')"

RESULT=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout="${TIMEOUT}" -o StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new \
  "${USER}@${HOST}" \
  "db2 \"${SQL}\"" 2>&1) || {
  RC=$?
  echo "[!] SSH or db2 command failed (rc=${RC})."
  echo "[*] Fallback: trying CL DSPPTF commands..."
  FOUND=0
  for PTF in ${PTFS}; do
    CL_OUT=$(ssh -o ConnectTimeout="${TIMEOUT}" "${USER}@${HOST}" \
      "system \"DSPPTF LICPGM(5770SS1) SELECT(${PTF})\"" 2>&1) || true
    if echo "${CL_OUT}" | grep -qiE 'temporarily applied|permanently applied'; then
      echo "[+] PATCHED — PTF ${PTF} is applied on ${HOST}."
      FOUND=1
      break
    fi
  done
  if [ "${FOUND}" -eq 0 ]; then
    if echo "${CL_OUT}" | grep -qiE 'not found|CPF0'; then
      echo "[-] VULNERABLE — No CVE-2026-77153 PTF detected on ${HOST}."
      exit 1
    else
      echo "[?] UNKNOWN — Could not determine PTF status on ${HOST}."
      echo "    Manual check: DSPPTF LICPGM(5770SS1) SELECT(SJ11502)"
      exit 2
    fi
  fi
  exit 0
}

# Parse SQL result
if echo "${RESULT}" | grep -qiE 'SJ11522|SJ11524|SJ11523|SJ11502'; then
  echo "[+] PATCHED — CVE-2026-77153 PTF found and applied:"
  echo "${RESULT}" | grep -iE 'SJ[0-9]+'
  exit 0
elif echo "${RESULT}" | grep -qi 'no rows'; then
  echo "[-] VULNERABLE — No CVE-2026-77153 PTF is applied on ${HOST}."
  echo "    Required PTFs: SJ11522 (7.3), SJ11524 (7.4), SJ11523 (7.5), SJ11502 (7.6)"
  exit 1
else
  echo "[?] UNKNOWN — Unexpected output from PTF query."
  echo "${RESULT}"
  echo "    Manual check: DSPPTF LICPGM(5770SS1) SELECT(SJ11502)"
  exit 2
fi