Like a photocopier that sometimes prints a sliver of the previous document on your page
CVE-2026-87886 is an out-of-bounds read (CWE-125) in Microsoft Office PowerPoint's file-parsing logic. When a user opens — or even previews in the Preview Pane — a specially crafted .pptx file, PowerPoint reads past the intended buffer boundary and may expose fragments of heap memory to the attacker. The flaw affects Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise, Office 2019, Office LTSC 2021, Office LTSC 2024, Office 365 for Mac, and PowerPoint 2016. It was patched in the September 2026 Patch Tuesday release. The impact is strictly information disclosure — there is no code execution, no privilege escalation, and no denial of service.
The likely CVSS baseline for this class of PowerPoint OOB-read bug is around 6.5 (MEDIUM) based on the identical sibling CVEs published the same day (CVE-2026-80086, CVE-2026-72977, CVE-2026-72975). That score is generous for a vuln that requires user interaction, yields only partial heap contents, and has zero integrity or availability impact. In a fleet of 10,000 managed endpoints with email gateway filtering and user-awareness training, the practical risk drops further. noisgate reassesses this at 5.5 MEDIUM — it belongs in your regular patch cycle, not your war room.
4 steps from start to impact.
Craft malicious PowerPoint file
.pptx file with a malformed record or embedded object that triggers an out-of-bounds read in PowerPoint's parsing code. This requires knowledge of the specific memory layout flaw but does not require authentication or any access to the target environment.- Knowledge of the OOB-read trigger in PowerPoint file format
- No public PoC or weaponized tool is known as of September 2026
- Crafting a reliable heap-disclosure payload requires reverse-engineering the parser
Deliver file to victim
.pptx via email attachment, file share link, or messaging platform. The file must reach the victim's inbox or download folder and survive any gateway scanning. Preview Pane rendering in Outlook or Explorer can also trigger the parse without a full open.- Victim reachable via email, chat, or file-sharing
- File must bypass email/web gateway content inspection
- Enterprise email gateways (Defender for Office 365, Proofpoint, Mimecast) scan Office attachments for malformed structures
- Content disarm and reconstruction (CDR) tools neutralize malformed Office files
- Security-aware users may not open unsolicited .pptx files
Victim opens or previews file
- User interaction: open or preview the file
- PowerPoint is an unpatched vulnerable version
- Protected View (sandbox) is enabled by default for files from external sources, which blocks most active content and external fetches
- Application Guard for Office further isolates the parse in a Hyper-V container on supported SKUs
- The attacker has limited control over *which* heap bytes are leaked — the data may be useless
Exfiltrate leaked memory
- Outbound network connectivity from the PowerPoint process
- Protected View must be bypassed or disabled for external fetches to fire
- Protected View blocks external data connections by default
- Network DLP and proxy inspection can detect anomalous outbound calls from Office processes
- Leaked heap fragments are typically small and may not contain actionable secrets
The supporting signals.
| In-the-Wild Exploitation | No known exploitation. Not listed in CISA KEV. No campaigns or threat actor usage reported as of 2026-09-16. |
|---|---|
| Proof of Concept | No public PoC. No exploit code found on GitHub, Exploit-DB, or researcher blogs. Sibling CVEs (CVE-2026-80086, CVE-2026-72977) also lack public PoCs. |
| EPSS Score | Estimated ~0.7% probability of exploitation in next 30 days, based on the identical sibling CVE-2026-80086 EPSS of 0.71%. Low percentile. |
| KEV Status | Not listed in CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. |
| CVSS Vector (inferred) | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N — Network vector, no privileges required, user interaction required, confidentiality-only impact. Baseline 6.5. |
| Affected Versions | Microsoft 365 Apps for Enterprise, Office 2019, Office LTSC 2021, Office LTSC 2024, Office 365 for Mac, Office LTSC for Mac 2021/2024, PowerPoint 2016 — all versions prior to September 2026 patches. |
| Fixed Versions | September 2026 Patch Tuesday cumulative updates. Specific build numbers vary by channel (Current Channel, Monthly Enterprise, Semi-Annual). Check MSRC advisory for exact builds. |
| Scanning/Exposure Data | No Shodan/Censys/GreyNoise exposure relevant — this is a client-side application, not a network service. Exposure is the entire population of unpatched Office installations (~hundreds of millions globally). |
| Disclosure Date | September 8, 2026 (Microsoft Patch Tuesday) |
| Reporter | Not publicly credited. Likely discovered internally by Microsoft or reported through MSRC bounty program. |
noisgate verdict.
The single most decisive factor is that this vulnerability's impact ceiling is information disclosure of partial heap contents on a single workstation, with no path to code execution, lateral movement, or privilege escalation. The required user interaction plus Protected View defaults further compress the realistic blast radius to individual-host, partial-confidentiality impact.
Why this verdict
- Impact ceiling is info-disclosure only. No code execution, no integrity impact, no availability impact. The attacker gets fragments of heap memory — not a shell, not credentials with any reliability, not persistence.
- User interaction required. The victim must open or preview a malicious file. Protected View is enabled by default for external files, adding a second click-through gate. This is a compounding friction point that drops real-world exploitability.
- No exploitation evidence or PoC. Zero KEV listing, no known campaigns, no public exploit code, EPSS under 1%. The threat is entirely theoretical as of September 2026.
- Role multiplier: negligible. PowerPoint is a workstation productivity application. It does not run on domain controllers, hypervisors, CI/CD servers, or network edge appliances. The blast radius of a successful exploit is confined to partial heap disclosure on a single endpoint — no fleet-scale, identity-scale, or supply-chain impact path exists.
Why not higher?
There is no code execution, no privilege escalation, and no lateral movement capability in this vulnerability. The leaked data is random heap fragments with no guarantee of containing secrets. PowerPoint is not a high-value-role component — it runs on end-user workstations, not infrastructure. Without a PoC, active exploitation, or KEV listing, there is no basis for HIGH.
Why not lower?
The network attack vector with no authentication requirement means any external attacker can attempt delivery via email. The Preview Pane attack surface means user interaction can be as minimal as selecting the file in Explorer. Confidentiality impact is rated High in the CVSS vector because the OOB read *can* expose sensitive heap data. This is not ignorable — it belongs in the regular patch cycle.
What to do — in priority order.
- Ensure Protected View is enforced for all external Office files — Protected View sandboxes the file parse and blocks external data connections, neutralizing the exfiltration channel. Verify via GPO:
User Configuration > Administrative Templates > Microsoft PowerPoint > Security > Trust Center > Protected View. No mitigation SLA applies at MEDIUM — go straight to the 365-day remediation window. - Enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules for Office applications — ASR rule 'Block Office applications from creating child processes' (D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A) and 'Block Office applications from creating executable content' limit post-exploitation pivots. Deploy via Intune or GPO.
- Deploy Content Disarm and Reconstruction (CDR) on email gateway — CDR strips and rebuilds Office file structures, neutralizing malformed records that trigger OOB reads. Products like Votiro, Deep Secure, or Glasswall provide this capability.
- Block .pptx attachments from untrusted external senders if feasible — If your organization rarely receives external PowerPoint files, a transport rule blocking or quarantining .pptx/.pptm from outside the org eliminates the delivery vector entirely.
- Network segmentation — irrelevant. This is a client-side file-parsing bug, not a network service exploit. Firewall rules between VLANs do not help.
- EDR behavioral detection alone — EDR may detect the exfil callback but will not prevent the OOB read itself. The memory disclosure happens inside the PowerPoint process before any detectable behavior occurs.
- Disabling macros — this is not a macro-based attack. The OOB read triggers during file parsing, not macro execution. Macro policies do not mitigate this flaw.
Crowdsourced verification payload.
Run on each target Windows host with PowerPoint installed. Execute in an elevated PowerShell session: powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .\Check-CVE-2026-87886.ps1. No network access required — it checks local Office installation version against known patched builds.
#!/usr/bin/env pwsh
# Check-CVE-2026-87886.ps1
# Checks if Microsoft Office PowerPoint is patched for CVE-2026-87886
# (September 2026 Patch Tuesday OOB-read info disclosure)
# Run locally on target host. Requires read access to registry and filesystem.
$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
$exitCode = 2 # UNKNOWN default
try {
# Locate PowerPoint executable
$pptPaths = @(
"$env:ProgramFiles\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\POWERPNT.EXE",
"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\POWERPNT.EXE",
"$env:ProgramFiles\Microsoft Office\Office16\POWERPNT.EXE",
"${env:ProgramFiles(x86)}\Microsoft Office\Office16\POWERPNT.EXE"
)
$pptExe = $null
foreach ($p in $pptPaths) {
if (Test-Path $p) { $pptExe = $p; break }
}
if (-not $pptExe) {
Write-Host 'UNKNOWN - PowerPoint not found on this host.'
exit 2
}
$ver = (Get-Item $pptExe).VersionInfo.FileVersion
Write-Host "Detected PowerPoint version: $ver"
# Parse version components
$parts = $ver.Split('.')
$major = [int]$parts[0]
$minor = [int]$parts[1]
$build = [int]$parts[2]
$rev = [int]$parts[3]
# September 2026 Patch Tuesday for Office 16.0 (M365/2019/2021/2024)
# Current Channel: 16.0.20000+ builds from Sept 2026
# The exact patched build varies by channel. Use build 20009 as approximate threshold.
# Adjust this threshold when Microsoft publishes exact build numbers.
$patchedBuild = 20009
$patchedRev = 20000
if ($major -eq 16 -and $minor -eq 0) {
if ($build -gt $patchedBuild) {
Write-Host 'PATCHED - PowerPoint version is newer than September 2026 patch baseline.'
$exitCode = 0
} elseif ($build -eq $patchedBuild -and $rev -ge $patchedRev) {
Write-Host 'PATCHED - PowerPoint version meets September 2026 patch baseline.'
$exitCode = 0
} else {
Write-Host 'VULNERABLE - PowerPoint version predates September 2026 patches. Update immediately.'
$exitCode = 1
}
} else {
Write-Host "UNKNOWN - Unexpected Office major version $major.$minor. Manual review needed."
$exitCode = 2
}
} catch {
Write-Host "UNKNOWN - Error during check: $_"
$exitCode = 2
}
exit $exitCodeIf you remember one thing.
Sources
What defenders are saying.
Crowdsourced verification outputs.
Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.