← Back to Feed CACHED · 2026-05-17 09:42:19 · cache_key CVE-2025-29912
tenable:216425 · Disclosed 2025-02-18

Ubuntu 20

ASSESSED — NOISGATE V0.5
Vendor
Reassessed
Verdict:
01 · The Real Story

This is a box of fiddly lock defects, not a vault door blown off its hinges

tenable:216425 is not one bug; it is Ubuntu's February 18, 2025 rollup for multiple Symfony issues in the php-symfony source package (USN-7272-1). The meaningful items range from query-string-driven environment/debug tampering (CVE-2024-50340) to programmatic login bypass edge cases (CVE-2024-50341) and remember-me cookie auth bypass (CVE-2024-51996), plus lower-impact information leaks, open redirect, XSS, and CSRF bugs. Ubuntu fixed these in 24.04 LTS: 6.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu3+esm1, 22.04 LTS: 5.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu8+esm1, and 20.04 LTS: 4.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm2, with several of the newer CVEs affecting only 22.04/24.04 or only 24.04.

Tenable labels the plugin HIGH, and if someone told you this was CRITICAL, that's overstated. The real-world story is that exploitation is highly app- and configuration-dependent: you need a live Symfony application, the relevant component in use, and often a specific deployment choice like register_argc_argv=On, remember-me persistence, or custom programmatic login flows. There is no KEV listing, no broad exploitation signal, and no generic one-request RCE here.

"High in the scanner, medium in the real world: app-specific Symfony flaws, not a turnkey Ubuntu compromise."
02 · The Attack Path

4 steps from start to impact.

STEP 01

Find a real Symfony target behind the Ubuntu host

An attacker first has to identify an actual internet-reachable Symfony application, not just an Ubuntu box with php-symfony packages installed. Typical tooling is httpx/curl plus response fingerprinting, framework error-page clues, or route behavior mapping. A local package finding on a server that never serves a Symfony app is noise, not exposure.
Conditions required:
  • Target runs a reachable web application built on Symfony
  • The vulnerable component is actually installed and loaded by that app
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Many Ubuntu hosts with the package are build nodes, CI runners, or internal apps
  • Reverse proxies and generic PHP stacks often hide framework fingerprints
Detection/coverage: Nessus local checks are good at package presence, but they do not prove an exposed or reachable vulnerable code path.
STEP 02

Confirm the specific vulnerable feature is in play

The attacker then has to line up the right bug with the right deployment. For CVE-2024-50340, that means a Symfony Runtime path plus register_argc_argv=On; for CVE-2024-50341, the app must use Security::login programmatically with a custom user_checker; for CVE-2024-51996, the app must use persisted remember-me cookies. Burp Suite or hand-crafted curl requests are enough to test behavior, but the preconditions are narrow.
Conditions required:
  • App uses the affected Symfony component
  • App is on an affected Ubuntu branch/version
  • The feature is enabled in that application design
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Most enterprises do not use every Symfony component or auth pattern
  • Several CVEs in this bundle do not affect 20.04 at all; some only hit 24.04
Detection/coverage: SCA and package scanners catch version ranges; DAST usually misses these unless you have app-aware test cases for each feature.
STEP 03

Deliver a crafted request, cookie, or URL

Exploitation is usually logic abuse, not memory corruption. Examples include a crafted query string to influence runtime environment/debug handling, a forged persisted remember-me cookie, or a specially formed URL for open redirect. This is low-skill once the app-specific preconditions are met, but there is no universal exploit string that works across all Symfony apps.
Conditions required:
  • Attacker can reach the relevant endpoint or auth flow
  • Application trusts the affected code path during request processing
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Modern apps often do not expose debug-sensitive behavior externally
  • Remember-me and programmatic login paths are narrower than generic login pages
Detection/coverage: Web logs, auth logs, and WAF telemetry may show suspicious query-string switches, cookie anomalies, or odd redirect targets; signature coverage is inconsistent.
STEP 04

Convert limited app abuse into business impact

The payoff is usually bounded: auth bypass into one app session, an information leak, an open redirect for phishing, or debug/environment manipulation that may aid further chaining. To reach full host compromise, the attacker typically still needs a second bug, weak secrets, unsafe debug exposure, or post-auth lateral movement. That's the key downgrade pressure here.
Conditions required:
  • Target app stores useful data or exposes privileged workflows
  • Attacker can chain the logic flaw into a higher-value objective
Where this breaks in practice:
  • Most included CVEs do not directly yield code execution on the host
  • Blast radius is commonly one application or one tenant context, not the whole Ubuntu server
Detection/coverage: App-specific detections matter more than network IDS here; look for impossible login states, remember-me anomalies, and unexpected redirects/debug toggles.
03 · Intelligence Metadata

The supporting signals.

In-the-wild statusNo strong exploitation signal found. The covered Symfony CVEs are not present in CISA KEV based on current KEV catalog review.
KEV statusNot KEV-listed as of the current CISA catalog review; no KEV add date applies.
Proof-of-concept availabilityNo mainstream weaponized exploit kit surfaced in primary-source review. What is public are vendor advisories, patch commits, and feature-specific descriptions; this looks like *patch-diff-driven* exploitation, not Metasploit-grade commodity tradecraft.
EPSSRepresentative public signal stays low-to-moderate: GitHub shows CVE-2024-50345 EPSS 0.394% (61st percentile). That is not the profile of a hot internet-exploitation bug.
CVSS vector reality checkThe scariest score in the bundle is CVE-2024-50340: 7.3 / CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L, but Ubuntu still assigns it Medium priority because the vulnerable condition is deployment-specific (register_argc_argv=On).
Affected Ubuntu ranges24.04 and 22.04 carry the newer runtime/network issues; 20.04 is not affected by CVE-2024-50340 or CVE-2024-50342. CVE-2024-50341 and CVE-2024-51996 were only addressed for 24.04 in USN-7272-1.
Fixed versionsUbuntu fixed the source package at 6.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu3+esm1 (24.04), 5.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu8+esm1 (22.04), and 4.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm2 (20.04). These are Ubuntu backports, so do not compare them naively to upstream Symfony version numbers.
Exposure/scanning dataInternet-scale fingerprinting is weak because this is a library/framework issue, not a clean appliance banner. BitSight still reports a global footprint of 1,384 observations for CVE-2024-50345, which indicates some public presence but not clean enterprise-attributable exposure.
Disclosure timelineUpstream Symfony advisories landed on November 6, 2024 and November 13, 2024; Ubuntu shipped the rollup notice USN-7272-1 on February 18, 2025.
Researchers / reportingNamed reporters include Sam Mush, Oleg Andreyev, Antoine Makdessi, Moritz Rauch, Linus Karlsson, Chris Smith, Pierre Rudloff, and others across the bundled CVEs.
04 · The Call

noisgate verdict.

Final Verdict
DOWNGRADED to MEDIUM (5.1/10)

The decisive downgrade factor is feature and deployment specificity: this plugin flags package presence, but real exploitation generally requires a live Symfony app using the exact vulnerable component and, in several cases, a narrow configuration or auth design choice. There is also no KEV or broad active-exploitation evidence, so this does not justify a fleet-wide emergency label.

HIGH Downgrade from CRITICAL/HIGH to MEDIUM for enterprise patch prioritization
MEDIUM Assessment of exposure population across a mixed Ubuntu estate
MEDIUM Interpretation of the highest-risk path being `CVE-2024-50340` / `CVE-2024-51996` rather than the lower-impact bundle members

Why this verdict

  • Downgrade: package presence is not reachable exposure. Tenable proves Ubuntu package state, not that the host is serving an exploitable Symfony route to attackers.
  • Downgrade: multiple prerequisites stack. Real attacks need a live Symfony application plus the affected component plus a specific pattern such as register_argc_argv=On, programmatic Security::login, or persisted remember-me cookies.
  • Downgrade: blast radius is usually application-scoped. Most paths yield auth bypass, info leak, redirect abuse, or debug/env manipulation inside one app, not turnkey host-level code execution.
  • Downgrade: affected population narrows by release. Some of the most interesting CVEs do not affect 20.04, and some were only addressed for 24.04, which sharply limits broad fleet risk.
  • Downgrade: no exploitation evidence. Current review found no KEV entry and no strong public campaign signal that would force an urgent threat-driven upgrade.

Why not higher?

This does not earn HIGH or CRITICAL because there is no universal pre-auth RCE path and no evidence that an unauthenticated internet attacker can reliably convert the plugin hit into host compromise across normal Ubuntu deployments. The chain is app-aware and conditional, which is exactly the kind of friction CVSS overstates when you manage 10,000 hosts.

Why not lower?

I would not drop this to LOW or IGNORE because some members of the bundle can still meaningfully weaken exposed production apps. In particular, runtime environment/debug tampering and remember-me or programmatic-login auth issues can create real business impact when they land on an internet-facing Symfony service.

05 · Compensating Control

What to do — in priority order.

  1. Prioritize exposed Symfony apps first — Triage this finding by internet reachability and app role, not by raw Ubuntu package count. For a MEDIUM verdict there is no mitigation SLA, but you should still front-load externally exposed Symfony services and admin portals before internal-only or build hosts.
  2. Turn off register_argc_argv where feasible — This specifically cuts risk from CVE-2024-50340 on affected 22.04/24.04 web stacks. Validate PHP runtime defaults and deploy the config change during normal change control if your application does not require argv parsing.
  3. Review remember-me and programmatic login usage — Check whether the application actually uses persisted remember-me cookies or Security::login with custom user checkers. If those features are absent, your reachable risk collapses even if the package scanner still fires.
  4. Harden edge logging and alerting — Add detections for odd query-string switches, unusual redirect targets, and remember-me cookie anomalies so exploitation attempts are visible while you work through remediation. For MEDIUM, this is hygiene rather than an emergency control.
What doesn't work
  • Generic network blocking doesn't solve this well; the risky behavior lives inside legitimate application request flows on already-allowed web ports.
  • Relying on WAF alone is weak here; several paths are logic flaws or auth-state mistakes, and signature coverage is inconsistent.
  • Treating all plugin hits as equally urgent is the wrong control; many hosts with the package are not serving exploitable Symfony code at all.
06 · Verification

Crowdsourced verification payload.

Run this on the target Ubuntu host with a regular shell; sudo is only needed if your environment restricts dpkg-query or /etc/os-release. Example: bash verify_symfony_usn7272.sh. The script checks installed php-symfony* packages against the Ubuntu fixed versions for 20.04, 22.04, and 24.04 and prints VULNERABLE, PATCHED, or UNKNOWN.

noisgate-verify.sh
BASHREAD-ONLYSAFE
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# verify_symfony_usn7272.sh
# Check Ubuntu USN-7272-1 (Symfony vulnerabilities) package state.
# Exit codes:
#   0 = PATCHED / not installed
#   1 = VULNERABLE
#   2 = UNKNOWN / unsupported environment

set -u

status_unknown() {
  echo "UNKNOWN: $1"
  exit 2
}

status_vuln() {
  echo "VULNERABLE: $1"
  exit 1
}

status_patched() {
  echo "PATCHED: $1"
  exit 0
}

if [[ ! -r /etc/os-release ]]; then
  status_unknown "/etc/os-release not readable"
fi

# shellcheck disable=SC1091
source /etc/os-release

release="${VERSION_ID:-}"
case "$release" in
  "24.04") fixed="6.4.5+dfsg-3ubuntu3+esm1" ;;
  "22.04") fixed="5.4.4+dfsg-1ubuntu8+esm1" ;;
  "20.04") fixed="4.3.8+dfsg-1ubuntu1+esm2" ;;
  *) status_unknown "Unsupported Ubuntu release: ${release:-unknown}" ;;
esac

if ! command -v dpkg-query >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  status_unknown "dpkg-query not found"
fi

# Collect installed binary packages built from the php-symfony source package naming pattern.
mapfile -t pkgs < <(dpkg-query -W -f='${db:Status-Abbrev}\t${Package}\t${Version}\n' 'php-symfony*' 2>/dev/null | awk '$1 ~ /^ii/ {print $2 "\t" $3}')

if [[ ${#pkgs[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
  status_patched "No installed php-symfony* packages found"
fi

vuln_found=0
report=""
for line in "${pkgs[@]}"; do
  pkg="${line%%$'\t'*}"
  ver="${line#*$'\t'}"

  if dpkg --compare-versions "$ver" lt "$fixed"; then
    vuln_found=1
    report+="$pkg=$ver (< $fixed); "
  else
    report+="$pkg=$ver (>= $fixed); "
  fi
done

if [[ $vuln_found -eq 1 ]]; then
  status_vuln "USN-7272-1 threshold for Ubuntu $release is $fixed. $report"
else
  status_patched "All installed php-symfony* packages meet or exceed $fixed for Ubuntu $release. $report"
fi
07 · Bottom Line

If you remember one thing.

TL;DR
Monday morning: do not treat this like a fleet-wide fire drill. First, intersect the plugin hits with internet-facing Symfony applications on 22.04 and 24.04, then verify whether those apps actually use the risky features called out above; for a MEDIUM verdict there is no noisgate mitigation SLA — go straight to the 365-day remediation window. Use that 365-day noisgate remediation SLA to cleanly patch the real exposed apps first, then mop up internal-only and non-serving hosts as backlog hygiene, documenting where package presence does not equal reachable exposure.

Sources

  1. Tenable Nessus Plugin 216425
  2. Ubuntu USN-7272-1
  3. Ubuntu CVE-2024-50340
  4. Ubuntu CVE-2024-50341
  5. Ubuntu CVE-2024-51996
  6. GitHub Advisory GHSA-mrqx-rp3w-jpjp / CVE-2024-50345
  7. BitSight footprint for CVE-2024-50345
  8. CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog
Peer Review

What defenders are saying.

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Validation Results

Crowdsourced verification outputs.

Results submitted by users who ran the verification payload against their environment.